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THE CLEAR-STATEMENT CHEVRON CANON
Nicholas R. Bednar*

ABSTRACT
As Chevron has fallen into disfavor with some, judges and scholars
have begun searching for alternative formulations of administrative
law’s favorite deference doctrine. Some judges have embraced Matthew
Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule’s One-Step Chevron. But One-Step
Chevron’s theoretical foundations lacks practical application.
This Article argues that judges can make One-Step Chevron workable by reframing it as a clear-statement rule: “Unless refuted by the clear
language of the statute, a court must defer to an agency interpretation.”
Scholars have long labelled Chevron as a “canon,” but have never
framed Chevron as a substantive canon. Chevron works as a substantive canon without disturbing the traditional Chevron analysis. The
Chevron Canon reforms the two-step deference doctrine using an interpretive tool familiar to all judges. This Article also resolves a longstanding dispute about the place of Chevron on the continuum of
substantive canons. The Chevron Canon trumps tiebreaking canons,
but succumbs to institutional clear-statement rules.
The Chevron Canon promotes simplicity and casts Chevron as a
traditional tool of statutory interpretation. As judges reconsider Chevron, the Chevron Canon presents a more intuitive option than One-Step
Chevron.
I. INTRODUCTION
Chevron is, and always has been, about framing. The seminal 1984
case, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,1
created the namesake doctrine’s two steps: first whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue, and second whether
* J.D., University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., University of Minnesota. Above all, I
must thank Kristin Hickman for her guidance and comments. Thank you to Brett McDonnell,
Mark Thomson, and Gerald Kerska for their comments. Additional thanks to Karianne Jones,
Emily Scholtes, Grace Doherty, Jake Gilbert, Zac Van Cleve, and the editors of the DePaul Law
Review. All mistakes are, of course, my own.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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the agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable.2 Justice Stevens, who authored the Court’s opinion, never intended Chevron to
depart from prior precedent.3 But his equivocal opinion has generated much debate about Chevron’s proper application.4 All standards
of review, including Chevron, are malleable and become confused as
reviewing judges respond differently to new situations.5 In Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB,6 Justice Frankfurter described standards of
review as a “mood” that “only serve as a standard of judgment and
not as a body of rigid rules assuring sameness of application.”7 Correspondingly, judges can disagree about the substance of Chevron’s
steps but reach the same outcome in any given case. Over time, scholars and jurists have produced a number of different substantive
frameworks of Chevron, all of which reflect different interpretations
of Chevron’s vague directive.8
Although most scholars focus on the contours of Chevron’s Step
One and Step Two,9 Matthew Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule argue
2. See id. at 842–43. The full recitation of Chevron’s two-steps are as follows:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute . . . . Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
3. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 398, 412–21 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
4. See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L.
REV. 611 (2009) (arguing against One-Step Chevron); Gary S. Lawson, Reconceptualizing Chevron and Discretion: A Comment on Levin and Rubin, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1377 (1997) (endorsing Levin’s conception of Step Two Chevron); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step
Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997) (proposing that Chevron has one primary
step and an optional step); Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 IND. L.J. 605
(2014) (advocating for a hard look Step Two); Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule,
Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009) (proposing a One-Step Chevron).
5. Martha S. Davis & Steven Alan Childress, Standards of Review in Criminal Appeals: Fifth
Circuit Illustrations and Analysis, 60 TUL. L. REV. 461, 561 (1986); see also 5 KENNETH C. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29:2 (2d ed. 1984) (acknowledging the relative unimportance
of standard of reviews’ boilerplate in administrative law).
6. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
7. Id. at 487.
8. See Kristin E. Hickman & Nicholas R. Bednar, The Waxing and Waning (or Not) of Chevron, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (cataloging the various interpretations of Chevron’s two steps).
9. I use “Traditional Chevron,” “Step One,” and “Step Two” to refer to Chevron’s traditional
doctrine and steps. “One-Step Chevron” refers specifically to the standard crafted by Matthew
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that Chevron “has only one step.”10 Stephenson and Vermeule identify two conceptions of Step Two, both of which render this additional
step superfluous.11 If Step Two asks whether the agency reasonably
interpreted the statute as a matter of statutory interpretation, then
Step Two is “mutually convertible” with Step One.12 On the other
hand, if Step Two asks whether the agency’s interpretation is the result
of arbitrary-and-capricious decisionmaking, then Step Two is redundant with State Farm13 hard look review.14 Hence the only question
One-Step Chevron asks is whether the agency’s interpretation falls
within the “range of permissible interpretations” or, rather, the “zone
of ambiguity.”15
Some judges, including the late-Justice Scalia, have nodded to Stephenson and Vermeule’s concerns of redundancy.16 Yet, One-Step
Chevron as currently conceived is difficult to apply. No traditional
statutory interpretation analysis requires courts to define a “zone of
ambiguity” in the way expressed by Stephenson and Vermeule. Furthermore, One-Step Chevron may conflict with the Supreme Court’s
holding in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Services17 because it does not distinguish between mandatory
Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule. Finally, I refer to my own conception of Chevron as the
“Chevron Canon.”
10. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 597.
11. This realization is not new, but one that has been popularized in recent years by Stephenson and Vermeule. See, e.g., 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 170–71
(4th ed. 2002) (noting that many courts interchangeably apply Chevron’s two steps); Levin, supra
note 4, at 1282–83 (characterizing Step Two reversals on statutory interpretation grounds as
“belatedly discovered clear meaning,” and arguing that courts should decide such cases at Step
One).
12. See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 599.
13. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1981).
14. See id. at 603–04.
15. Id. at 601.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 493 (2012)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“ ‘Step 1’ has never been an essential part of Chevron analysis. Whether
a particular statute is ambiguous makes no difference if the interpretation adopted by the agency
is clearly reasonable—and it would be a waste of time to conduct that inquiry. The same would
be true if the agency interpretation is clearly beyond the scope of any conceivable ambiguity. It
does not matter whether the word ‘yellow’ is ambiguous when the agency has interpreted it to
me ‘purple.’ ” (citations omitted)); Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1025 (6th Cir.
2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016) (mem.); United States v. Garcia-Santana, 774 F.3d 528,
542–43 (9th Cir. 2014); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2010);
Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009);
Cisneros v. Napolitano, No. 13-700 JNE/JJK, 2013 WL 3353939, at *6 n.5 (D. Minn. July 3, 2013)
(“[T]he two steps of the Chevron doctrine can arguably be merged into a single inquiry. . . . As it
must, this Court retains the two-step framework of Chevron, but acknowledges that the framework can create confusion.”).
17. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
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and permissible interpretations of a statute. If One-Step Chevron is to
be taken seriously by courts, scholars must find a more practical way
of presenting the reformulated standard.
This Article argues that reconstructing Chevron as a clear-statement
rule eliminates Traditional Chevron’s redundancy, while presenting a
simpler version of One-Step Chevron. Scholars have long described
Chevron as a “canon” but have never bothered to frame it in the traditional substantive-canon literature.18 The Chevron Canon commands,
“Unless refuted by the clear language of the statute, a court must defer to an agency interpretation.”19 Reframing One-Step Chevron as a
clear-statement rule accomplishes three goals: First, it reforms Chevron into a preexisting tool of statutory interpretation, ensuring ease of
applicability. Second, it informs an agency when a statute clearly
mandates or forbids particular interpretations, as required by Brand
X. Finally, it solves a longstanding dispute about whether substantive
canons apply to the Chevron analysis.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part II argues that while Stephenson and Vermeule’s One-Step Chevron has merit, courts struggle
to apply it.20 The Article then develops the Chevron Canon as an alternative to One-Step Chevron. Part III reviews traditional understandings of substantive canons.21 Part IV then places Chevron Canon
in the framework described in Part III, arguing first that, like many
institutional clear-statement rules, Chevron is founded on constitutional values of legislative supremacy and separation of powers and,
second, Chevron already carries interpretive weight similar to an institutional clear-statement rule because courts focus on Step One’s clarity question.22 Next, Part V explains how the Chevron Canon
interacts with tiebreaking canons and other institutional clear-statement rules.23 Finally, Part VI discusses the Chevron Canon’s potential
critiques.24

18. See infra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.
19. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 618–19 (1992). Unfortunately, William Eskridge and Philip Frickey do not develop the Chevron Canon much more outside of this
statement. See infra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 26–88 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 89–143 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 144–237 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 238–305 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 306–27 and accompanying text.
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II. ONE-STEP CHEVRON
At the heart of Matthew Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule’s OneStep Chevron is redundancy. Depending on how one parses the Supreme Court’s Chevron opinion, Step Two is redundant with either
Step One or State Farm hard look review. Stephenson and Vermeule
resolve this redundancy by reducing Chevron to one step, but the resulting analysis is more theoretical than pragmatic. Without further
exposition, Stephenson and Vermeule’s One-Step Chevron creates a
standard of review just as difficult to apply and understand as Traditional Chevron.
A. Chevron’s Redundancy
Justice Stevens’ Chevron opinion supports numerous constructions
of the doctrine’s two steps. No matter how one reads the Chevron
opinion, Step One is a question of statutory interpretation.25 At Step
One, if the court finds that the language of the statute is clear after
“employing traditional tools of statutory construction,” then the inquiry ends.26 The court and the agency must give effect to “the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”27 The depth of Step One’s
inquiry will depend on the court’s understanding of “how clear is
clear?”28 If “the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue,” then the court reviews the
agency’s interpretation under Step Two.29
According to Stephenson and Vermeule, Chevron’s redundancy appears at Step Two. Justice Stevens described Step Two in a number of
ways throughout his opinion. At first, he states that “if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”30 Justice Stevens noted that “[t]he court need
not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in
a judicial proceeding.”31 This language frames Step Two as a question
25. See generally Note, “How Clear Is Clear” in Chevron’s Step One?, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1687 (2005).
26. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
27. Id. at 842–43.
28. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 520 (1989) (“Here, of course, is the chink in Chevron’s armor—the ambiguity that
prevents it from being an absolutely clear guide to future judicial decisions . . . .”).
29. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 843 n.11.
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of statutory interpretation aimed at whether the court can reach the
agency’s interpretation through traditional interpretive means.
An interpretive Step Two is redundant with Step One’s statutory
interpretation question. If an agency’s interpretation conflicts with
the plain meaning of the statute at Step One, then the interpretation is
unreasonable at Step Two. If the court finds that the statute is ambiguous at Step One but concludes that the agency’s interpretation falls
outside the “permissible range of readings,” then “Congress’s precise
intention was to exclude the agency’s interpretation from the permissible range.”32 Citing Stephenson and Vermeule, Justice Scalia
claimed that Step One has “never been an essential part of Chevron,”
because “[w]hether a particular statute is ambiguous makes no difference if the interpretation adopted by the agency is clearly reasonable”
or “clearly beyond the scope of any conceivable ambiguity.”33 Stephenson and Vermeule argue that both Step One and Step Two are
“always mutually convertible” because both steps present statutory interpretation questions.34 The sole question presented by Chevron
under this reading of Step Two is whether the agency’s interpretation
is a reasonable construction of the statute.
Later in the Chevron opinion, Justice Stevens described Step Two as
asking whether the agency’s interpretation is “arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.”35 This statement echoes the arbitrary and capricious standard under section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).36 If Step Two asks judges to review
whether the agency’s interpretation is arbitrary and capricious, then
Step Two is redundant with State Farm hard look review.37 As the
language of the Chevron opinion illustrates, the idea of employing
State Farm at Step Two is not as “revisionist” as one recent commen32. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 600.
33. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 493 n.1 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
34. See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 600–01.
35. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
36. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”).
37. See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 603. In State Farm the Supreme Court articulated the arbitrary and capricious standard—“hard look review”—pursuant to section 706 of
the APA. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 42–43 (1981) (“Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise.”).

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-3\DPL304.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 7

30-AUG-17

THE CLEAR-STATEMENT CHEVRON CANON

12:50

825

tator has sought to describe it.38 The D.C. Circuit has employed a
hard look Step Two since 1984, though not always consistently.39
Ronald Levin has advocated that courts should apply hard look review at Step Two to give meaning to Chevron’s “extra baggage.”40
More recently, some Supreme Court justices have endorsed a hard
look Step Two.41
Stephenson and Vermeule argue that courts should apply Chevron
and State Farm separately because the application of hard look review
at Step Two forces courts to address whether the statute is ambiguous
even when the “agency has clearly failed the reasoned decision-making requirement.”42 Criticizing Stephenson and Vermeule’s One-Step
Chevron, Kenneth Bamberger and Peter Strauss respond that State
Farm review differs depending on the agency’s action and offers
courts invaluable tools for assessing the “reasonableness” of an
agency’s interpretation at Step Two.43 Nevertheless, Chevron and
State Farm feasibly operate as separate tests. Because this Article
does not pass judgment on the doctrinal wisdom of one step versus
two, I accept arguendo Stephenson and Vermeule’s assessment that
Chevron and State Farm operate best as distinct standards.
B. Eliminating Redundancy with One-Step Chevron
Stephenson and Vermeule eliminate the redundancy between Step
One and an interpretive Step Two by collapsing both steps into a single inquiry that examines the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation.44 They diagram One-Step Chevron on a line with three points:
a “ ‘best’ interpretation,” a “permissible interpretation” within a
38. See Re, supra note 4, at 607 (“Bamberger and Strauss actually defended two-step Chevron
based on their own revisionist view—namely, that step two replicates the Administrative Procedure Act’s general prohibition on arbitrary-and-capricious agency action.” (footnote omitted)).
39. See, e.g., Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (reversing an agency decision at Step Two because the PBGC’s position did not “reflect the results of a
reasoned decisionmaking process”); see also Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.2d
1444, 1450–54 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
40. See Levin, supra note 4, at 1296. Gary Lawson has called Levin’s piece a “commentator’s
nightmare”—“well argued, well written, and almost certainly right.” Lawson, supra note 4, at
1377.
41. See, e.g., Encino Motor Cars v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–26 (2016); Michigan v. EPA,
135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707–08 (2015) (citing State Farm in requiring the EPA to consider cost when
interpreting the phrase “appropriate and necessary” in the Clean Air Act); Judulang v. Holder,
565 U.S. 42, 52–53 (2011).
42. See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 603–04.
43. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 4, at 621–24.
44. See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 602.

R

R
R

R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-3\DPL304.txt

826

unknown

Seq: 8

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

30-AUG-17

12:50

[Vol. 66:819

“range of permissible interpretations,” and a third point outside this
realm.45 According to the authors:
The statutory language, read in the light of the traditional tools of
statutory construction, will suggest to the reviewing court both a
“best” interpretation of the statute . . . and a range of interpretations that are sufficiently plausible that the court would view them
as reasonable, though not ideal. This range is the statute’s “zone of
ambiguity,” the set of interpretations which the statute does not
clearly prohibit. If the agency promulgates an interpretation within
this zone, then under Chevron the review court must uphold the
agency’s interpretation, even though it differs from the court’s mostpreferred construction . . . . But if the agency chooses an interpretation outside the range of permissible meanings, the court must
strike it down.46

This zone of ambiguity represents a “policy space within which agencies may make reasoned choices.”47
When applying One-Step Chevron, a court may not defer to an
agency interpretation if (1) the statute mandates a single interpretation or (2) if the agency’s interpretation falls outside the zone of ambiguity. The first scenario embraces Step One’s mandate that courts
and agencies “must give effect to the unambiguous expressed intent of
Congress.”48 The second scenario acknowledges that “Congress’s intention may be ambiguous within a range, but not at all ambiguous as
to interpretations outside that range, which are clearly forbidden.”49
For example, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,50 the Supreme Court considered the Immigration and Nationality Service’s (INS) interpretation
of “well-founded fear” under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA).51 The INS construed both “well-founded fear” and “clear
probability of persecution” to require an asylum applicant to prove
“that it is more likely than not that he or she will be persecuted.”52
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens acknowledged that there “is obviously some ambiguity in a term like ‘well-founded fear.’ ”53 The
statute’s plain language and legislative history, however, demonstrated that Congress clearly did not intend “well-founded fear” and
“clear probability of persecution” to require the same standard of
45. Id. at 601 (displaying a diagram of a line with three points of potential interpretations—
two within the “zone of ambiguity” and one outside of this zone).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
49. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 602.
50. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
51. See id. at 423.
52. Id. at 443.
53. Id. at 448.
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proof.54 In other words, the INS’s interpretation fell outside the zone
of ambiguity and was therefore impermissible under Chevron.
Stephenson and Vermeule dismiss attempts to distinguish Step One
and Step Two by narrowing Step One to ask only “whether Congress
has clearly specified one, and only one, permissible interpretation of
the statute.”55 According to Stephenson and Vermeule, “This approach assumes that a statute can unambiguously forbid an agency’s
interpretation only when Congress has specified a single possible
meaning.”56 In other words, the plain language of a statute may
clearly forbid some interpretations while leaving enough ambiguity to
allow for agency interpretation. For example, a statute authorizing an
agency to select the font of warning labels on cigarette packaging
probably permits the agency to select between Times New Roman and
Helvetica but surely forbids the agency from selecting Wingdings.57
Cardoza-Fonseca is again instructive. Congress unambiguously intended “well-founded fear” and “clear probability of persecution” to
have two different meanings. “Well-founded fear” is an ambiguous
term open to interpretation by the INS.58 But the INS is constrained
by the statutory text, and it is a maxim of statutory interpretation that
Congress meaningfully varies language in its statutes.59 The plain language of the INA does not mandate a single interpretation of “wellfounded fear,” but it prevents the INS from adopting the same interpretation as “clear probability of persecution.” Under Traditional
Chevron, the Court could frame its holding either under Step One
(the INA clearly prohibits the adoption of the same interpretation for
both terms) or Step Two (“well-founded fear” is ambiguous but the
INS unreasonably adopted the same interpretation for both terms).
Under One-Step Chevron, the Court would conclude that the INS’s
interpretation is unreasonable because it falls outside the zone of
ambiguity.
54. Id. at 449.
55. See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 602.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012) (requiring warning labels on cigarette packaging and
permitting the FDA to make rules regarding the “text, format, and type sizes” of such warning
labels). Whether a selection of Comic Sans would survive hard look review is an issue that has
yet to come before the courts. See Holly Combs & David Combs, Ban Comic Sans Manifesto,
1000MANIFESTOS.COM, http://www.1000manifestos.com/ban-comic-sans/ (last visited Apr. 17,
2017) (“[W]hen designing a ‘Do Not Enter Sign’ the use of a heavy-stroked, attention-commanding font such as Impact or Arial Black is appropriate. Typesetting such a message in Comic Sans
would be ludicrous. . . . It is analogous to showing up for a black tie event in a clown costume.”).
58. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448.
59. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1996) (refusing to adopt varying definitions of “claim” under the Internal Revenue Code).
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I credit Stephenson and Vermeule with encouraging judges to confront their framing of Chevron. One-Step Chevron builds a theoretical base from which Chevron can be simplified; however, One-Step
Chevron lacks pragmatic value as a standard of review. First, Stephenson and Vermeule’s formulation leaves no place for the court to
find that the statutory text mandates only one interpretation, raising
conflicts with the Supreme Court’s holding in Brand X.60 Second,
judges will have similar difficulties applying One-Step Chevron as they
do Traditional Chevron.
C. One-Step Chevron Conflicts with Brand X
Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Brand X, if a court has concluded in a prior case that the statute at issue mandates one interpretation, then the agency cannot adopt an alternative interpretation of
the statute.61 But if the court concluded that the statute is ambiguous
with respect to the particular issue, then the agency may change its
interpretation to a different permissible construction of the statute.
Brand X affords the agency flexibility in effectuating its mission. Stephenson and Vermeule acknowledge the importance of allowing agencies to adopt alternative constructions,62 but their One-Step Chevron
threatens this flexibility.63
In a response to Stephenson and Vermeule’s article, Kenneth Bamberger and Peter Strauss criticize One-Step Chevron as incompatible
with Brand X.64 One-Step Chevron muddles the distinction between a
mandatory interpretation and a permissible interpretation. Both
mandatory and permissible interpretations survive One-Step Chevron’s reasonableness inquiry, but the court is not instructed to hold
whether the statute mandates a particular interpretation.
60. 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005).
61. Id.
62. See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 605–06 (citing Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982–85)
(“[T]he more judges are inclined to declare that a statute has one and only meaning, the harder
it will be for future agencies to adopt alternative constructions of the same statute that the initial
court did not anticipate.”).
63. It is possible that Stephenson and Vermeule see a greater degree of indeterminacy in language. Indeed, most statutory interpretation cases come down to one or two plausible interpretations. If all cases came down to a finite number of plausible interpretations, I have no doubt
One-Step Chevron could be reconciled with Brand X. As is, the Supreme Court has spent over a
hundred years arguing about the meaning of “waters of the United States.” See Rapanos v.
United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722–30 (2006). It is for these murkier cases, in which it is impossible
to pin the proper analysis down to one or two interpretations, which I think One-Step Chevron
cannot work.
64. Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 4, at 616–20.
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Pre-Brand X cases illustrate the difficulty of deciphering whether a
court has held that an agency’s interpretation is a mandatory interpretation or a permissible one. In Edelman v. Lynchburg College65 the
Supreme Court considered the validity of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation requiring a filer to verify a
“charge” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act after the time for
filing has expired.66 The Court began its discussion by noting that the
statute is “open to interpretation and the regulation addresses a legitimate question.”67 The Court implied that Chevron deference may be
appropriate but ultimately found “no need to resolve any question of
deference.”68 Rather, the Court held,
We find the EEOC rule not only a reasonable one, but the position
we would adopt even if there were no formal rule and we were interpreting the statute from scratch. Because we so clearly agree
with the EEOC, there is no occasion to defer and no point in asking
what kind of deference, or how much.69

Post-Brand X, it is unclear whether the EEOC could change its understanding of “charge”; the Court noted the statute’s ambiguity but refused to apply Chevron and seemed to suggest that the EEOC’s
interpretation was mandatory.
Stephenson and Vermeule preemptively respond, “[T]here is no
good reason why we should decide whether the statute has only one
possible reading before deciding simply whether the agency’s interpretation falls into the range of permissible interpretations.”70 But if
One-Step Chevron truly has one step, then a court need not revisit
whether the statute mandates a single interpretation once it finds that
the agency’s interpretation falls within the zone of ambiguity. Bamberger and Strauss argue that agencies “might be deterred from seeking regulatory changes warranted by sound policy by the
misimpression that a court has already given a precedential imprimatur to outdated choices.”71 Rulemaking diverts resources from other
agency goals and an agency is less likely to pursue rulemaking it perceives as preempted by a prior holding.
Admittedly, this concern is possibly blown out of proportion.
Courts could remedy this problem by adopting an additional step after
the reasonableness inquiry in which the court identifies whether the
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

535 U.S. 106 (2002).
Id. at 109.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 114.
Id.
See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 602.
Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 4, at 618–19.
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agency’s interpretation is mandatory.72 Nothing about One-Step
Chevron prevents a court from informing the agency whether the statute mandates one interpretation. If a court’s holding is ambiguous,
such as that of Edelman, an agency reconsidering its interpretation
will weigh the importance of regulatory change against its odds of convincing the court that its first interpretation was permissible rather
than mandatory. But if we are already recasting Chevron, is the risk
of more muddled decisions and doctrine worthwhile? Brand X aside,
One-Step Chevron presents even greater hurdles that ought to be considered by reformers.
D. Courts Cannot Easily Apply One-Step Chevron
Stephenson and Vermeule suggest that most courts have “a clear
understanding of the two relevant questions” and apply Chevron
“without tripping over the superfluity” of its steps.73 Scholars hoping
to reformat Chevron must convince courts of the alternative formulation’s ease of use. One-Step Chevron is easy enough to apply when
the plain text of the statute mandates a single interpretation or forbids
a particular interpretation. Stephenson and Vermeule’s inquiry, however, focuses not on this clarity question but the reasonableness of the
agency’s interpretation.
Stephenson and Vermeule suggest that an agency’s interpretation
may be unreasonable for reasons other than contrary statutory text.
They claim that the zone of ambiguity is not “fixed” and may depend
on “the court’s confidence in the agency’s expertise, its sympathy for
72. Richard Re has proposed introducing an optional second step that asks whether the statute mandates the agency’s reasonable interpretation. See Re, supra note 4, at 618–19. Re argues
that it may “be preferable for courts to postpone ruling out potential agency constructions until
they are adopted by the government and squarely challenged as unreasonable.” Id. at 624. Re’s
suggestion is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, an agency may mistakenly find that the court
exercised this optional step, even though the court did not intend to mandate a particular interpretation. For example, in Edelman v. Lynchburg College, the Supreme Court concluded the
agency’s interpretation was reasonable and then stated it would reach the same result “even if
. . . we were interpreting the statute from scratch.” 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002). Under the optional
two-step approach, the agency may read this language as a statement of “mandatoriness,” even if
the Court only meant to imply that the agency’s interpretation represented the best, permissible
construction. Second, Re ignores the realities of the regulatory process. The average rulemaking procedure takes four years (though it may take as long as fourteen years), costs hundreds of
millions of dollars, and diverts resources away from other agency goals. See generally U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-205, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED
TO MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF RULES DEVELOPMENT AS WELL AS TO THE TRANSPARENCY OF OMB REGULATORY REVIEWS 5 (2009) (reviewing the results of sixteen significant
rulemaking procedures). Thus, Re’s argument rigidifies agency responses to rulings in the same
way as Stephenson and Vermeule’s One-Step Chevron.
73. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 605.
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the agency’s policy goals, or its assessment of the importance of the
interpretive issue.”74 This language suggests that Stephenson and
Vermeule seek to incorporate the pre-Chevron contextual factors to
ascertain the boundaries of the zone of ambiguity.75 If so, One-Step
Chevron is too similar to “th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test.”76
Statutory ambiguity is a textual feature that should be assessed only
with traditional tools of statutory interpretation. Agency expertise
and agency policy goals are unrelated to whether Congress drafted an
ambiguous statute; a statute is not any clearer because the court sympathizes with the agency’s policy pursuit. Furthermore, judges will
differ on how much weight to accord each factor and how that factor
should expand or restrict their finding of statutory ambiguity. Including contextual factors limits One-Step Chevron’s simplicity by adding
complex variables that not even Traditional Chevron (in most of its
framings) possesses.77
Moreover, One-Step Chevron gets lost in the weeds of “reasonableness” and the “zone of ambiguity.” Stephenson and Vermeule’s discussion of the zone of ambiguity suggests that One-Step Chevron
requires judges to find boundaries of ambiguity. As they phrase it, the
statutory text will suggest both a “ ‘best’ interpretation of the statute”
and “a range of interpretations that are sufficiently plausible that the
court would view them as reasonable, though not ideal.” Aside from
contextual factors, how does one assess the reasonableness of an interpretation if the plain text of the statute does not clearly prohibit the
interpretation? In an ambiguous statute, where does the zone of ambiguity end and unreasonableness begin? No statutory interpretation
74. Id. at 601 n.19. To the extent Stephenson and Vermeule argue courts should consider
extra-statutory factors, their One-Step Chevron looks similar to Justice Breyer’s conception of
Chevron. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 541–45
(2014) (describing Justice Breyer’s “more blended approach” to Chevron as a “word cloud” and
stating, “When one assembles the picture, what pops out, and does it favor deference or counsel
against it?”).
75. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (listing contextual factors such as
“the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”).
76. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239–41 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. But see City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1875 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(including contextual factors in his description of Chevron). Justice Breyer has continually asserted that many of the so-called Skidmore factors are applicable in Chevron. Justice Breyer
does not view Chevron as a departure from Skidmore but rather an additional reason to defer.
Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 596 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Chevron made no
relevant change. It simply focused upon an additional, separate reason for deferring to certain
agency determinations, namely that Congress had delegated to the agency to the legal authority
to make those determinations.”).
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analysis requires courts to identify a zone of ambiguity or range of
reasonable interpretations. In a traditional statutory interpretation
case, courts deconstruct the walls of ambiguity to arrive at a single,
“best” interpretation.78 Under Chevron, courts focus on finding either
statutory clarity or ambiguity.79 The statutory text either prohibits or
permits the agency’s interpretation. In sum, courts either locate a single “best” meaning of the statute or compare the interpretation to the
statute to assure conformity with the text.
Admittedly, Stephenson and Vermeule probably never intended
courts to identify the boundaries of statutory ambiguity, but their article reads that way. The zone of ambiguity works as a descriptive explanation of Chevron’s redundancy. But this theoretical description
wants of a pragmatic iteration. If courts could theoretically identify
all possible interpretations of statute, then they could easily assess an
agency’s interpretation for reasonableness. In reality, whether an
agency’s interpretation falls within the zone of ambiguity remains a
question of whether the statute is clear on the “precise question at
issue.”80
This argument seems wholly semantic until one learns that courts
have yet to properly apply One-Step Chevron.81 In United States v.
Garcia-Santana,82 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the “one-step approach makes much more sense” in rejecting the Board of Immigration Appeals’ interpretation of “conspiracy.”83 Relying on Supreme
Court precedents, the Ninth Circuit held that “Congress intends to
adopt the common law definition” of generic federal crimes when a
statute is ambiguous with respect to these crimes.84 Yet the court concluded that it did not matter what form of Chevron the court applied
]because the agency’s interpretation was both contrary to the clear
text and unreasonable in light of contrary Supreme Court precedent.85
78. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 337–38 (1986) (suggesting that statutes should be
interpreted “in the best light overall”).
79. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
80. See id.
81. See generally, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Santana, 774 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2014); United
States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 493 n.1 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Friends of the Everglades v.
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1219–28 (11th Cir. 2009); Cisneros v. Napolitano, No.
13-700 (JNE/JJK), 2013 WL 3353939 (D. Minn. July 3, 2013).
82. 774 F.3d 528.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 543 (quoting United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1994)).
85. See id. (“Whether we characterize this conclusion as (1) a rejection of the BIA’s interpretation at Chevron step one because the only correct traditional tool of statutory construction
ambiguously yields a different result, or (2) a rejection at Chevron step two on the ground that

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-3\DPL304.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 15

30-AUG-17

THE CLEAR-STATEMENT CHEVRON CANON

12:50

833

In Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Water Management District,86 the Eleventh Circuit cited Stephenson and Vermeule, suggesting that “[a]ll that matters is whether the regulation is a
reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute.”87 But the Eleventh
Circuit applied both steps of Chevron, first finding that the statute was
ambiguous and then concluding that the agency had reasonably construed the statute.88 Some judges appear to embrace the conceptual
ideals behind One-Step Chevron but fail to apply the revised standard.
This suggests that One-Step Chevron requires a more pragmatic iteration outside of Stephenson and Vermeule’s logic-gamed analysis.
One-Step Chevron needs improvement. Stephenson and Vermeule
offered a simplified Chevron, but wrapped it in theoretical packaging.
An alternative exists that addresses concerns of redundancy while
presenting courts with a pragmatic and simplified Chevron standard.
To the extent that One-Step Chevron seeks to ascertain solely whether
the agency’s interpretation comports with the statute, Chevron operates just as well as a substantive canon. Construing Chevron as a
clear-statement rule eliminates redundancy, conforms to Brand X, and
recasts Chevron as a traditional tool of statutory interpretation.
III. THE ROLE OF SUBSTANTIVE CANONS
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

IN

Among the many implements in the judge’s interpretive toolbox,
substantive canons are perhaps the most specialized.89 Substantive canons resolve statutory ambiguities in favor of desired policy outcomes
and apply only in narrow circumstances, such as in a particular area of
law or when one interpretation presents extra-statutory concerns. No
typology fully satisfies their diverse range of rationales and applications,90 but existing categorical models are essential to framing any
discussion of substantive canons. For the purposes of a Chevron Cathe statute is ambiguous but the BIA’s interpretation unreasonable in light of its improper methodology, makes no difference.”).
86. 574 F.3d 1210.
87. Id. at 1219.
88. Id. at 1227–28.
89. Scholars use different terminology to refer to these policy-based canons. Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 117 n.27 (2010). For uniformity, I refer to them as “substantive canons,” though others may call them “normative
canons” or “maxims.”
90. Although this Article favors a more fluid continuum of the strength of substantive canons,
a full reconsideration of current literature is left for another time. For various explanations of
substantive canons, see generally, for example, Barrett, supra note 89; James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 1 (2005); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Communicating the Canons: How Lower Courts React
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non, it is enough to consider the potential policy rationales behind
substantive canons and the weight that judges accord these canons.
A. The Policy Rationales and Interpretive Weight
of Substantive Canons
United States courts create and apply substantive canons based on
perceived public values.91 A 2010 study by Amy Coney Barrett
reveals that United States courts have historically padded substantive
canons in perceived legislative intent.92 For example, in Talbot v.
Seeman,93 Chief Justice John Marshall justified the principle that
courts should interpret law in accordance with the “law of nations” on
the basis that “the legislature of the United States will always hold
sacred” those principles.94 However, as Barrett acknowledges, this rationalization is too simplistic.95 Not all canons mesh well with the idea
of legislative intent.96 Canons may also reflect statutory purpose,
quasi-constitutional law,97 rule of law principles,98 a preference for legal continuity,99 or any other normative principle.
When the Supreme Court Changes the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 100 MINN. L. REV. 481
(2015).
91. Substantive canons have existed since at least 1584. See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and
the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 345 (2010) (quoting Heydon’s Case, (1584)
76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (L.R. Exch.)). All fifty states and the District of Columbia have codified
certain interpretive principles as a guide for courts. The federal government lacks any comparable statute, though some scholars argue Congress should adopt a statute of this nature. See
generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2085 (2002).
92. Barrett, supra note 89, at 158 (exploring all cases from 1789 to 1840 that applied the rule
of lenity, Charming Betsy, avoidance, the presumption against retroactivity, the sovereign immunity clear statement rules, and the Indian canon).
93. 5 U.S. 1 (1801).
94. Id. at 44. This canon is more commonly known as the Charming Betsy canon. See Murray
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 104 (1804).
95. Barrett, supra note 89, at 158 (“[T]he modern treatment of substantive canons reveals that
a canon’s purpose often lies in the eyes of the beholder . . . .”).
96. For example, the Indian canon was originally founded on the principle that courts should
liberally interpret treaties between Indians and the federal government in favor of the Indians.
See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832) (M’Lean, J., concurring), abrogated by Nevada
v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (holding that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction over wardens for
federal civil rights claims). Despite Worcester’s abrogation on unrelated grounds, the Indian
canon remains a viable substantive canon applied by circuit courts. See, e.g., Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648, 656–58 (6th Cir. 2015); Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino
v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 728–31 (9th Cir. 2003).
97. See generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 19.
98. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1999).
99. See generally David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 921 (1992).
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The rule of lenity illustrates the complexity of labelling the policy
goals of canons. Lenity requires courts to interpret ambiguous provisions in favor of the accused when interpreting criminal statutes.100
Lenity may reflect values of legislative supremacy by discouraging
courts from establishing common law crimes.101 Alternatively, lenity
may ensure that the public has adequate notice of criminalized conduct.102 Other scholars posit that lenity promotes legislative transparency, checks the prosecutorial charging authority, or quells the
tyranny of the majority that pushes legislatures to expand criminal
law.103
One can identify multiple rationales for numerous canons.104 Of
course, some canons may be so specific as to reflect only one value.
Statute-based canons or canons limited to particular regulatory areas
often fall into this category. For example, the canon that courts
should construe veterans’ benefits statutes in favor of the beneficiary
derives from purposivist notions that Congress acted to promote veterans’ welfare.105
The policy rationale imputed to the canon by the interpreter influences how much weight the interpreter accords the canon. Canons
100. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971).
101. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (“[L]egislatures, not courts, define criminal liability.”).
102. See United States v. Rivera, 265 F.3d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The rule-of-lenity fosters
the constitutional due-process principle ‘that no individual be forced to speculate, at peril of
indictment, whether his conduct is prohibited.’ ” (quoting Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100
(1979))); see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 19, at 600 (“This canon is closely related to the
rule to avoid constitutional difficulties, for a lenient interpretation of a criminal statute obviates
inquiries into underlying due process concerns.”).
103. See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885,
911–25 (2004); Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 758 (1999) (contending that legislators delegate
authority to prosecutors to appear “tough on crime”).
104. The Charming Betsy canon may promote legislative supremacy, international law, or
preservation of the balance between Congress and the President in foreign affairs. See Curtis A.
Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role
of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 495–504, 524–29 (1997). Jurists and scholars have
grounded the constitutional avoidance canon in judicial restraint, legislative supremacy, or judicial enforcement of the Constitution. See Note, Should the Supreme Court Presume that Congress Acts Constitutionally? The Role of the Canon of Avoidance and Reliance on Early
Legislative Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1798, 1812–16 (2003).
The absurdity canon may, again, reflect legislative supremacy or due process and equal protection requirements. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TESTS 239 n.18 (2012); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and
Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 544 (2013) (describing problems with textualists’
use of the absurdity canon).
105. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 284–85 (1946); see also
King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220–21 n.9 (1991).
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fall along a continuum of other canons and interpretive principles.
For simplicity, scholars generally place substantive canons in two categories: tiebreakers (weak) and clear-statement rules (strong). Courts
use tiebreakers to decide between two plausible interpretations and
only apply these canons in cases when the statute is ambiguous. In
contrast, clear-statement rules require a contrary clear statement from
Congress to overcome the canon’s presumption.106 Clear-statement
rules permit a judge to forgo the “best” interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision in favor of effectuating the canon’s policy goal.
Beyond clear-statement rules are “ ‘super-strong clear-statement
rules,’ which establish very strong presumptions of statutory meaning
that can be rebutted only through unambiguous statutory text
targeted at the specific problem.”107
Depending on the policy rationale accorded to the canon by the
judge, some canons can be framed as either tiebreakers or clear-statement rules.108 As such, a substantive canon’s label is not decisive.109
According to Zachary Price, the “key question” in applying a substantive canon “is what rank the rule holds relative to other interpretive
conventions.”110
The avoidance canon illustrates the subtle problems that may arise
in weighing canons. The avoidance canon instructs courts to construe
statutes to evade potential constitutional problems. In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,111 the majority refused to adopt an interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) granting the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) jurisdiction over collective
bargaining in Catholic high schools. The majority feared that the
agency’s interpretation implicated the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment.112 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger concluded that “[t]here is no clear expression of an affirmative intention of
Congress that teachers in church-operated schools should be covered
by the Act.”113
106. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATUTORY INTERPRETA362–66 (2012). The Supreme Court has acknowledged this categorization. See Astoria
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1991) (comparing clear-statement
rules to presumptions).
107. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 19, at 611–12.
108. Price, supra note 103, at 891.
109. Barrett, supra note 89, at 167.
110. Price, supra note 103, at 890.
111. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
112. Id. at 491–95, 507.
113. Id. at 504 (emphasis added). Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Catholic Bishop,
courts have held that NLRB jurisdiction over religious schools does not violate the First Amend-
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Justice Brennan’s dissent illuminates the strength with which the
majority applied the avoidance canon.114 According to the dissent,
the avoidance canon applies only when the alternative “construction
of the statute is fairly possible” in order to prevent “wholesale judicial
dismemberment of congressional enactments.”115 The NLRA “covers
all employers not within the eight express exceptions.”116 Legislative
history reveals that Congress rejected an amendment that would have
included religious organizations within these exceptions.117 Absent
the avoidance canon, Justice Brennan’s interpretation adheres more
faithfully to the whole act and Congress’s intent. Justice Brennan’s
avoidance canon resembles a more traditional clear-statement rule by
deferring to contextual hints of congressional intent. Chief Justice
Burger’s analysis, however, presents something closer to a superstrong clear statement rule because nothing short of a clear textual
affirmation, such as “the NLRB has jurisdiction over religious institutions,” will satisfy his avoidance canon.
In sum, two factors influence the weight a judge accords a canon:
the policy value the judge attributes to the canon and the importance
of that policy value to the judge’s ideology. Judges accord different
weights to substantive canons because they perceive the value of certain canons as greater or lesser than other canons. Any attempt to
construct a new substantive canon must therefore evaluate the canon’s
underlying policy value.
ment. See Christopher M. Gaul, Note, Catholic Bishop Revisited: Resolving the Problem of Labor Board Jurisdiction over Religious Schools, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV., 1505, 1533–34 (2007).
114. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 508–11 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The general principle of
construing statutes to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions is a well-settled and salutary
one. The governing canon, however, is not that expressed by the Court today.”). The Court
relied on Machinists v. Street:
When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided.
Id. at 510 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1961)).
Justice Brennan lambasted the majority’s construction of the avoidance canon:
This limitation to constructions that are ‘fairly possible,’ and ‘reasonable,’ acts as a
brake against wholesale judicial dismemberment of congressional enactments. It confines the judiciary to its proper role in construing statutes, which is to interpret them so
as to give effect to congressional intention. The Court’s new ‘affirmative expression
rule’ releases that brake.
Id. at 510–11 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
115. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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B. The Scope of Clear-Statement Rules
According to the Supreme Court, clear-statement rules only protect
“weighty and constant values.”118 These canons may embody constitutional values or “constrain[ ] judicial discretion in the interpretation
of the laws . . . .”119
Scholars question the validity and scope of these canons. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that statutory interpretation “is often
more a question of policy than of law.”120 As Congress is the supreme
policymaker in the federal government,121 judges should carry out
Congress’s will when interpreting statutes—whether its will is best understood through textualist or purposivist interpretation is a separate
debate.122 Scholars disagree as to whether clear-statement rules violate principles of legislative supremacy and result in arbitrary judicial
activism.123 Clear-statement rules may result in undemocratic and
118. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991).
119. Id. at 109.
120. Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991).
121. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 487 n.1 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“A
judge is first and foremost one who resolves disputes, and not one charged with the duty to
fashion broad policies establishing the rights and duties of citizens. That task is reserved primarily for legislators.”).
122. Textualism and purposivism are not the only faithful agency theories. “Intentionalism”
and “purposivism” are often used interchangeably today but have historically represented two
different approaches to statutory interpretation. See Adam N. Steinman, “Less” Is “More”?
Textualism, Intentionalism, and a Better Solution to the Class Action Fairness Act’s Appellate
Deadline Riddle, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1183, 1196 n.73 (2007). For simplicity, I contrast textualism
with purposivism.
I also acknowledge that dynamists disagree with faithful agency theorists. Dynamists believe
Congress and the courts are “cooperative partners.” See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About
Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 990, 992 (2001) (“In my view, Article III judges are both agents carrying out
directives laid down by the legislature and partners in the enterprise of law elaboration, for they
(like the legislature) are ultimately agents of ‘We the People.’ ”). Dynamic statutory interpretation accords more interpretive power to the judicial branch than purposivism or textualism. But,
even the most renowned dynamists acknowledge that the court has some duty to carry out Congress’s will. According to Eskridge, “the agent is supposed to follow the general directives embodied in the contract and the specific orders given her by the principal, but her primary
obligation is to use her best efforts to carry out the general goals and specific orders over time.”
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 125 (1994). To the extent
that dynamism refocuses the interpretive inquiry on statutory goals over statutory text, dynamists should have no qualms about applying clear-statement rules. I hesitate to accept that
courts have much of any policymaking authority and can broaden the application of statutes, so
long as they keep in line with the general goals of the legislation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1
(“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”). I am much more comfortable leaving
policy decisions (and for that matter dynamic interpretation) to Congress and the agencies they
assign to carry out regulatory tasks. I do not address dynamism throughout this Article, because
my Chevron Canon assumes the existence of a faithful agency relationship.
123. John Manning has summarized arguments of both critics and defenders:
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counter-majoritarian statutory interpretation to the extent that they
subvert Congress’s will. Yet clear-statement rules enjoy widespread
application among courts,124 rendering these existential debates moot
on a practical level.
Scholars who are at least somewhat amenable to clear-statement
rules have sought to restrict their scope to particular classes of policy
values. The majority view links clear-statement rules to the Constitution and the essential institutions of the U.S. government.125 Adhering to legislative supremacy principles, courts may only rely on their
own authority when interpreting statutes through extra-statutory
means.126 Institutional clear-statement rules comport with legislative
supremacy because the Constitution qualifies legislative supremacy.127
Thus, institutional clear-statement rules derive from judges’ foremost
role as “guardians of the Constitution.”128 These canons protect
under-enforced structural guarantees and reserve the power to deviate from structural norms to the politically accountable branches.129
Congress must act deliberately when it chooses to deviate from these
In short, critics argue (1) that the distortions of statutory meaning required by such
rules intrude upon legislative prerogatives no less than does Marbury-style judicial review; (2) that by creating judge-made penumbras around the Constitution, clear statement rules may, in fact, exacerbate the countermajoritarian difficulty typically
associated with judicial review; and (3) that the Court’s most recent clear statement
rules have favored some values (such as structural and property norms) over others
(such as civil liberties), without acknowledging any basis for the new emphasis. Defenders have variously replied (1) that clear statements do not interfere with legislative
supremacy but merely compel Congress to take responsibility for its choices; (2) that
one person’s “penumbras” are another person’s method of enforcing the Constitution
itself; and (3) that the clear statement rule device provides a benign way of protecting
so-called “underenforced constitutional norms”—values such as federalism and separation of powers, for which the Court has perennially had difficulty devising judicially
manageable standards.
John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 417
(2010).
124. Bruhl, supra note 90, at 499 (finding that the use of substantive canons by lower courts
has increased since the 1980s).
125. See Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, supra note 123, at 406-07. But
see Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 334 (2000) (arguing that
“social commitments” in certain regulatory areas, such as tax, benefits, and antitrust, may form
the basis of clear-statement rules).
126. See infra notes 153–69 and accompanying text.
127. Barrett, supra note 89, at 181.
128. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 454 (Alexander Hamilton) (A.B.A. ed., 2009). Other
scholars call these “quasi-constitutional” clear statement rules. See generally Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 19. As I discuss later, John Manning has critiqued this connection to the
Constitution as unfounded. See Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, supra note
123, at 437-38. I disagree with Manning’s conclusions but understand his overall point. I thus
refer to these types of canon as “institutional clear-statement rules” throughout.
129. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 19, at 631.
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norms to avoid upsetting the structural balance of government. For
example, the clear-statement rule requiring Congress to unambiguously define conditions attached to federal funding protects federalism by ensuring that states make informed decisions when deciding to
accept federal funding.130 As Daniel Farber stated, “These rules are
faithful to the constitutional scheme, and their use in statutory interpretation serves to advance by means of interstitial policymaking the
constitutional goals of democratic, just, and effective government.”131
Institutional clear-statement rules are founded in the penumbra of
constitutional values and send a warning to Congress. When a court
applies a clear-statement rule, it signals Congress to “stop and think”
about the systemic implications of the statute.132 If Congress intended
to deviate from the norm protected by the canon, it may amend the
statute to reflect that intent. In the case of the avoidance canon, if
Congress decides that it has acted constitutionally, then it may override the court’s interpretation and force the court to conduct constitutional review of the statute in a later case.133 Courts should, however,
exercise judicial review sparingly.134 Hence, institutional clear-statement rules restrain judges by encouraging courts to avoid confronting
constitutional issues.
Other scholars remain critical of the role of institutional clear-statement rules in statutory interpretation. John Manning responds that
quasi-constitutional values—such as federalism or separation of powers—are too amorphous and “abstracted from the concrete provisions
that define them.”135 As a result, quasi-constitutional values “are no
130. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1981).
131. Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO L.J. 281,
285 (1989).
132. See Barrett, supra note 89, at 175.
133. See William Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretations, 101 YALE L.J.
331, 338 (1991) (demonstrating that Congress overrides judicial interpretations with some
frequency).
134. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 470 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The very
nature of judicial review . . . makes courts the least subject to the Madisonian check in the event
that they shall, for the best of motives, expand judicial authority beyond the limits contemplated
by the Framers. It is for this reason that judicial self-restraint is surely an implied, if not an
expressed, condition of the grant of authority of judicial review.”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
120 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is not the business of this court to pronounce policy.
It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its own power, and this precludes the
Court’s giving effect to its own notions of what is wise or politic. That self-restraint is of the
essence in the observance of the judicial oath, for the Constitution has not authorized the judges
to sit in judgment on the wisdom of what Congress and the Executive Branch do.”); United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial
restraint, the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint.”).
135. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, supra note 123, at 438.
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longer constitutional values; they are just values.”136 According to
Manning, “one cannot meaningfully speak of a constitutional value
without reference to the constitution makers’ decisions about how to
put that value into effect.”137 As such, institutional clear-statement
rules present as many conflicts as any other canon.
Even if Manning’s assertion is true, is it a problem? In the words of
Justice Jackson, “The purpose of the Constitution was not only to
grant power, but to keep it from getting out of hand.”138 Accordingly,
“our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions
of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even
single Articles torn from context.”139
Admittedly, outside of particular doctrines like the dormant commerce clause, no provision of the Constitution requires courts to enforce broad values of federalism or separation of powers. But few
scholars would deny that the Constitution implicitly embraces these
values. Read together, Articles I, II, and III create a delicate balance
of power between the three branches of government.140 Similarly, Article I, Article IV, and the Tenth Amendment create separate spheres
of power for the federal government and the states.141 Courts may
confront possible interpretations of statutes deviating from these values that otherwise do not violate the Constitution. The “best” interpretation of a statute may survive constitutional review but still trigger
the federalism canon. Even though the “best” interpretation is consti136. Id.
137. Id. at 404.
138. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
139. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
140. Accord U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”);
id. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America.”); id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”).
141. Accord id. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation;
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold
and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.”); id. art. IV, § 1 (“Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”); id. § 2 (“The Citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”);
id. § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”); id. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-3\DPL304.txt

842

unknown

Seq: 24

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

30-AUG-17

12:50

[Vol. 66:819

tutional, Congress may not have intended the statute to obstruct state
rights. Principles of legislative supremacy dictate that these constitutional, but otherwise balance-upsetting, decisions should be made by
Congress, not courts. All institutional clear-statement rules—regardless of whether they truly reflect the Constitution—reflect institutional
values that Congress, the executive branch, and the courts should
strive to preserve.
Manning correctly notes that the values of clear-statement rules can
conflict.142 For example, one reading of a statute may raise federalism
concerns, while another implicates tribal sovereignty. That does not
mean, however, that clear-statement rules are foundationless. Conflicts between institutional values reveal tensions over the weight that
policymakers should accord competing norms. While the court must
decide the case in favor of one interpretation over another, clearstatement rules should not be altogether abandoned because they occasionally conflict. Rather, these conflicts represent great policy
choices that our democratic system must toil with when passing laws.
We cannot divorce ideology from statutory or constitutional interpretation. Manning, a prominent textualist, presents views a
purposivist would reject. Yes, judges will weigh these institutional values in light of their own ideologies and understandings of the law.
Even if courts reject these clear-statement rules and rule on the constitutionality of the statute, constitutional interpretation will still reflect the ideological values of the interpreter.143 Resorting to
constitutional interpretation, however, is more drastic than employing
institutional clear-statement rules. Clear-statement rules stop courts
from making decisions that rattle the balance of government until
such a time when the more politically accountable branches may decide these issues. Courts should afford Congress the opportunity to
decide whether it intended to digress from these values when enacting
the statute by invoking institutional clear-statement rules as an act of
judicial restraint.

142. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, supra note 128, at 437-38.
143. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 21-23 (2010) (calling originalism indeterminate); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 535, 549-58 (1999) (providing a set of criteria by which to evaluate the validity of constitutional theories). See generally Michael Moore, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 364 (1988) (describing originalism); Robert A. Stein, Foreword: A
Consequential Justice, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1 (2016) (comparing the constitutional
interpretation of Justices Scalia and Brennan).
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IV. THE CLEAR-STATEMENT CHEVRON CANON
The history of Chevron’s application supports reframing it as an institutional clear-statement rule. Describing Chevron as a canon is not
new, but few, if any, scholars have sought to frame Chevron within the
traditional substantive canon framework. Rather “canon” has often
acted as a convenient label much in the same way as “rule” or “standard.” In a catalogue of clear-statement rules, William Eskridge and
Philip Frickey described the Chevron standard as a substantive canon:
“Unless refuted by the clear language of the statute, a court must defer to an agency interpretation.”144 Eskridge and Frickey, however,
did not take the time to explain Chevron in the context of the substantive canon literature. Published in 1992, Eskridge and Frickey’s explanation spans barely a page and ignores the literature regarding
Chevron’s two steps.145 While I adopt their framing, their piece serves
otherwise little value for the contemporary administrative law scholar
studying Chevron. In subsequent works, both authors have depicted a
more traditional and elaborate understanding of Chevron.146 This
Part develops Chevron’s place in this catalogue of clear-statement
rules.
The Chevron Canon operates like any other clear-statement rule.
The court searches for a clear statement from Congress forbidding the
agency’s interpretation. If the court can find no such statement, then
the agency’s interpretation receives deference. If Congress, however,
clearly intended to prohibit the agency’s interpretation, then the
agency does not receive deference. The Chevron Canon offers more
simplicity than either One-Step Chevron or Traditional Chevron. The
court neither searches for a zone of ambiguity, nor tangles in the redundancy of Chevron’s two steps.
A. The Policy Value(s) of Chevron
Richard Pierce describes Chevron as “a coherent hierarchical relationship among the three branches of government that is consistent
with the text of the Constitution, the intent of the Framers, and the
basic principles of democracy the Framers were attempting to further.”147 Similarly, Judge Laurence Silberman of the D.C. Circuit heralds Chevron as a “sound recognition that a political branch, the
144. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 19, at 618.
145. See id. at 618-19.
146. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 106, at 644–831.
147. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2227
(1997).
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executive, has a greater claim to make policy choices than the judiciary.”148 I agree.
Since the death of the nondelegation doctrine,149 Congress has
shifted much of the regulatory lawmaking process to administrative
agencies. Courts have ceded much of their authority to agencies, providing agencies flexibility to implement policies and interpret ambiguous statutes.150 Together, the APA and the Supreme Court’s
administrative law precedent have built a more modern understanding
of U.S. lawmaking. To govern this more complex and hierarchical
form of lawmaking, the Supreme Court has adopted new understandings of the separation of powers.151 Chevron and its progeny form the
most important blueprint of the U.S. lawmaking scheme and the separation of powers since Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.152
Chevron protects legislative supremacy and Congress’s ability to
delegate lawmaking authority to agencies. Article I, section 1 vests
the legislative power of the United States in Congress.153 For this reason, the constitutional norm of legislative supremacy subordinates
courts to Congress in the policymaking realm, but the judiciary retains
the power to review the law’s constitutionality.154 In the statutory
context, legislative supremacy requires courts to interpret statutes
faithfully to the will of Congress.
John Manning offers an explanation of legislative supremacy’s constitutional roots.155 Legislative supremacy derives from two features
fundamental to the U.S. system of government: (1) separation of powers and (2) bicameralism and presentment.156 According to Manning,
148. Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron: The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 821, 822 (1990).
149. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989); John Locke, The Second
Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285, 381 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988)
(confining the legislative power “only to make Laws, and not to make Legislators, the Legislative
can have no power to transfer their Authority of making Laws, and place it in other hands”). For
cases applying the nondelegation doctrine, see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 537-39 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 425-26 (1935).
150. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 30 (2016).
151. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (“[I]n our increasingly complex society, replete with ever
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to
delegate power under broad general directives.”).
152. 343 U.S. 579, 634–55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
153. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”).
154. See Farber, supra note 131, at 282.
155. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
56–105 (2001).
156. Id. at 58, 70; see also Barrett, supra note 89, at 115.
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the Founders departed from the English system of equitable interpretation, which permitted courts to pursue equity over textual adherence. Article III of the Constitution severed the connection between
the judicial and legislative powers. The Constitution “takes pains to
ensure judicial independence from the control and functions of the
political branches,” but in doing so “undercuts any judicial claim to
derivative lawmaking authority.”157 Furthermore, the Constitution
creates a complex lawmaking regime through Article I, section 7’s bicameralism and presentment requirements,158 which are intended to
“break and control the violence of faction.”159 Equitable interpretation may lead judges to “systematically undercut” the separation of
powers protected by bicameralism and presentment.160 Legislative
supremacy thus promotes the separation of powers by preventing judicial intrusion in the lawmaking process.
Legislative supremacy controls not only the relationship between
Congress and the courts but also the relationship between Congress
and administrative agencies. Article II, section 3 requires that the
President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”161
The executive branch’s role as executioner of laws is derived from the
laws passed by Congress, and Congress may be as specific in its instructions as it wishes.162 So long as Congress prescribes an “intelligible principle,” Congress may delegate policymaking authority to
executive agencies.163 Complex societal problems require experts in
medicine, agriculture, and technology to adapt regulatory programs to
evolving circumstances. Congress intentionally leaves provisions ambiguous when it expects the implementing agency—staffed by relevant
experts—to promulgate regulations to effectuate a broad regulatory
regime.164 But agencies must adopt regulations in conformance with
157. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, supra note 155, at 58–59.
158. See id. at 70.
159. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 45 (James Madison) (A.B.A. ed., 2009).
160. See Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, supra note 155, at 78.
161. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
162. Biodiversity Assocs. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004).
163. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“Apply this ‘intelligible principle’ test to congressional delegations, our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad
general directives.”); see also J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928). But see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935); Pan.
Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420-25 (1935).
164. Richard Pierce has argued that Chevron creates a rivalry between Congress and the executive branch by requiring Congress to speak clearly in order to minimize executive intrusion in
the lawmaking process—creating a de facto nondelegation doctrine. See Pierce, supra note 147,
at 2232. If this is the case, then Chevron represents a check on congressional authority. Yet
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their delegated authority. Absent delegation, Congress can freely
carry out this policymaking on its own. If the agency does a poor job
executing its task, Congress may revoke the agency’s authority or allocate it to a more faithful agency.165
Chevron is thus best explained as an implicit delegation from Congress to agencies to resolve statutory ambiguities.166 According to the
Supreme Court in United States v. Mead Corp.,167 Chevron applies
when Congress intended the agency to speak with the force of law and
the agency promulgated its interpretation in an exercise of that authority.168 Empirical studies support this congressional-intent theory.
Lisa Bressman and Abbe Gluck’s 2014 survey of congressional drafters found that Congress views “agencies as the everyday statutory interpreters.”169 If Congress expects agencies—not courts—to interpret
statutes, courts should defer to agency interpretations because the decision to delegate interpretive authority is a policy decision left up to
Congress.
The congressional–agency relationship, therefore, represents a delicate principal–agent relationship between Congress and the executive
that courts ought not to fiddle with unless the agency takes an unconCongress has admitted, at least in Bressman and Gluck’s study, that it wants agencies to have
interpretive lawmaking authority. The U.S. regulatory system is far too complex and specialized
for 535 elected officials. Congress needs help from experts who can best implement these regulatory regimes. Pierce’s analysis ignores that what Congress giveth, Congress can taketh away.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that “a refusal to overrule an agency’s construction of
legislation is at least some evidence of the reasonableness of that construction.” United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 137 (1985). Congress holds all of the power in this
relationship.
165. See G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 724 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that Congress has the authority to revise a statute to prohibit or authorize an agency’s interpretation),
vacated, No. 16-273, 2017 WL 855755 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017) (mem.).
166. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996) (“Congress, when it left
ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity
would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the
courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”); John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 202 (1998) (“Chevron is primarily a case about delegation, not deference.”); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833–34 (2001).
167. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
168. Id. at 226–27 (“We hold that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or
notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.” (emphasis added)).
169. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 725, 765 (2014).
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stitutional action or the agency violates Congress’s directive. The Supreme Court has recognized that it is not a policymaker and it is “not
at liberty to substitute its own discretion for that of administrative officers who have kept within the bounds of their administrative powers.”170 The Chevron Court recognized that statutory interpretation
in the administrative law context “really centers on the wisdom of the
agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a
gap left open by Congress.”171 The Chevron Court further acknowledged that its role did not extend to lawmaking:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political
branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile
competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences . . . . While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make
such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left
to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the
statute in life of everyday realities . . . .
. . . [F]ederal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to
respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and
resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: “Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches.”172

Statutory interpretation in the administrative law context is often less
saying “what the law is”173 and is more akin to the policymaking conducted by Congress.
Courts must respect Congress’s decision to delegate interpretive authority to agencies. Chevron is consistent with the constitutional presumption identified in Youngstown Sheet & Tube that “[w]hen the
President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”174
Chevron checks executive authority by preventing agencies from
straying too far outside of their delegated tasks. If an agency interprets a statute contrary to its clear text, then “the agency is due no
170. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 236 (1936).
171. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
172. Id. at 865–66 (emphasis added) (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195
(1978)).
173. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
174. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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deference, for Congress has left no gap for the agency to fill.”175 Statutory clarity represents Congress’s decision to reserve its authority as
the federal government’s supreme policymaker. Agencies, like courts,
must respect Congress’s intent.176
To protect congressional delegation of interpretive authority, the
clear-statement Chevron canon commands: “Unless refuted by the
clear language of the statute, a court must defer to an agency interpretation.”177 When an agency has faithfully interpreted a statute, the
reviewing court may only overturn an agency interpretation to protect
the Constitution from congressional or executive action.178 The court
may exercise this authority in one of two ways. First, it may use another institutional clear-statement rule to signal Congress that the
agency’s interpretation threatens an institutional value.179 If Congress
approves of the agency’s interpretation and suspects that it is otherwise constitutional, then Congress retains the authority to adopt the
agency’s initial interpretation through legislation. Second, the Court
may consider the constitutional question and hold that the agency’s
interpretation is unconstitutional. As discussed earlier,180 the use of
other institutional clear-statement rules is preferable for preserving
legislative supremacy.
The Supreme Court has already begun to pad Chevron in this hierarchical understanding of the separation of powers. In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency,181 the Supreme
Court rejected Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations
that “would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in
EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.”182 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia opined, “It would be
patently unreasonable—not to say outrageous—for EPA to insist on
seizing expansive power that it admits the statute is not designed to
grant.”183 Justice Scalia described the agency’s duty as a faithful agent
to Congress:
Under our system of government, Congress makes laws and the
President, acting at times through agencies like EPA, “faithfully execute[s]” them. The power of executing the law necessarily includes
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1875 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring).
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 19, at 618–19.
Cf. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178.
See Barrett, supra note 89, at 175 n.316.
See supra Section II.B.
134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
Id. at 2444.
Id.
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both authority and responsibility to resolve some questions left
open by Congress that arise during the law’s administration. But it
does not include a power to revise clear statutory terms that turn
out not to work in practice.184

Gone are the days when the Court does not justify Chevron in constitutional rhetoric.185 Thus, Chevron rests comfortably alongside
other institutional clear-statement rules in protecting under enforced
constitutional norms.
B. Reconciling the Chevron Canon with the Weight of Step One
and Step Two
Construing Chevron as a clear-statement rule requires more than
simply finding a quasi-constitutional hook. To fit the clear-statement
rule framework, Chevron must be capable of overriding the “best”
interpretation of the statute. Undoubtedly, Chevron mandates deference to an agency’s interpretation over the “best” interpretation,
prohibiting a court from “substitut[ing] its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”186 If implemented, the Chevron Canon would do
little to disrupt the traditional weight courts have given to Traditional
Chevron because courts emphasize the clarity question of Step One
over the reasonableness question of Step Two.
The Chevron Canon behaves most similarly to Step One. Under
the Chevron Canon, a court may find a clear-statement in one of two
ways. First, a statute may be so clear as to mandate a single interpretation. A single, mandated interpretation forecloses deference because courts and the agency “must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.”187 Alternatively, a statute may be ambiguous, but the statutory text clearly precludes the agency from
adopting a particular interpretation. As Justice Scalia once explained,
“It does not matter whether the word ‘yellow’ is ambiguous when the
agency has interpreted it to mean ‘purple.’ ”188 The Chevron Canon
thus protects Brand X because the court may only override the
agency’s interpretation if the statute clearly prohibits the agency’s interpretation, signaling to the agency that its interpretation was
impermissible.
184. See id. at 2446 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 3).
185. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 166, at 866 (“But Chevron does not suggest that the
nondelegation doctrine or any other principle of separation of powers compels this outcome.”).
186. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
187. Id. at 842–43.
188. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 493 n.1 (2012).
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The text of the Chevron opinion can be read to support applying
Step One like a clear-statement rule.189 The Court describes Step
One as asking “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.”190 The Court goes on to state that if “the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction of the
statute.”191 This language suggests that courts should not overturn an
agency’s interpretation unless a clear statement in the statutory text,
addressing the precise question at issue, prohibits the agency’s
interpretation.
As applied by courts, Step One centers on a search for prohibiting
language—indicia that Congress wished to prevent the agency’s interpretation. For example, in National Credit Union Administration v.
First National Bank & Trust Co.,192 the Supreme Court found the
agency’s interpretation impermissible at Step One because the
agency’s interpretation both created surplusage and would render
other provisions of the statute meaningless.193 Similarly, in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court refused to defer to the agency’s interpretation because the agency’s interpretation violated the canon of meaningful variation.194 The Court found statutory clarity in both cases
because other statutory provisions and textual canons prohibited the
agency’s interpretation.
But absent prohibiting language, the Step One analysis in many
cases is relatively unintrustive, much like a clear-statement rule analysis. For example, in Yellow Transportation, Inc. v. Michigan,195 the
Court conducted little interpretive analysis and simply concluded that
the statute did not “foreclose” the agency’s interpretation.196 In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston and Maine Corp.,197 the
Court deferred to an agency’s interpretation merely because it was
“not in conflict with the plain language of the statute.”198 Some scholars have supported this less intrusive approach to Step One. Mark
Seidenfeld argued that “a court should find a statute silent or ambiguous under Chevron Step One unless the statute clearly manifests con189. I would never assert that this is the only interpretation supported by the Chevron opinion. Rather, it is one permissible interpretation.
190. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 843 (emphasis added).
192. 522 U.S. 479 (1998).
193. Id. at 500–01.
194. See 480 U.S. 421, 446–48 (1987).
195. 537 U.S. 36 (2002).
196. Id. at 45–46.
197. 503 U.S. 407 (1992).
198. Id. at 417–18.
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gressional intent to constrain agency discretion.”199 Thus the language
of the Chevron opinion and its subsequent application of Step One by
the Supreme Court has, at times, resembled a clear-statement rule.200
Step One’s clarity question still leaves space for interpretive disagreements and ideological posturing. Early in Chevron’s history, Justice Scalia prophesized that “the future battles over acceptance of
agency interpretations of law” would be fought at Step One.201 He
identified Step One’s greatest debate as “how clear is clear?”202 In a
later essay, he described substantive canons using similar language:
“how clear is an ‘unmistakably clear’ statement?”203 Indeed, the opinions of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan in Catholic Bishop
demonstrate the difficulties that sometimes come with defining clarity
for purposes of clear-statement rules.204 Recently, Judge Brett Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit remarked, “[J]udges often cannot make that
initial clarity versus ambiguity decision in a settled, principled, or
evenhanded way.”205 Through the exercise of either textualist or
purposivist ideology, judges may decide how clear Congress must
speak to preclude deference under the Chevron Canon. The Chevron
Canon thus has many of the same features as Chevron Step One.
By focusing on Step One’s clarity question, the Chevron Canon
abandons Step Two’s reasonableness inquiry. Step Two has always
lacked teeth. Thirteen years after Chevron, the Supreme Court still
had not reversed an agency interpretation at Step Two.206 Ronald
Levin remarked, “Inevitably one is moved to wonder whether Step
Two, as the Court conceives of it, serves any useful purpose at all.”207
A 1998 empirical study by Orin Kerr observed that circuit courts applying a two-step Chevron resolved the analysis at Step One in 38% of
cases.208 Among these 38% of cases, courts concluded that the
199. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 128 (1994) (emphasis added).
Seidenfeld argued in favor of a hard look Step Two. Id.
200. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (emphasis
added).
201. Scalia, supra note 28, at 520-21.
202. Id. at 520.
203. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 28
(1997).
204. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
205. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2118
(2016) (reviewing ROBERT KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
206. The first Step Two reversal came in 1999. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S.
366, 385-97 (1998).
207. Levin, supra note 4, at 1262.
208. Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 31 (1998).
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agency’s interpretation conflicted with the clear language of the statute in 58% of cases.209 In contrast, when courts reached Step Two,
they denied deference in only 11% of cases.210 A forthcoming study
by Kent Barnett and Christopher Walker presents similar findings.211
Barnett and Walker found that circuit courts resolve Chevron at Step
One in 27.2% of cases, with courts concluding that the agency’s interpretation conflicted with the clear language of the statute in 61% of
these cases. Similar to Kerr’s findings, when Barnett and Walker
found that when courts reached Step Two, they denied deference in
only 6.2% of cases.212 Chevron has thus always focused on a search
for a textual prohibition of the agency’s interpretation, not the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation.
The Supreme Court has been inattentive to Step Two, having only
resolved four cases against agencies at Step Two,213 reaffirming the
importance of statutory clarity and the relative unimportance of
reasonableness.
Sometimes, the focus of the Court remained on statutory clarity
even at Step Two. In its first Step Two refusal case, AT&T Corp. v.
Iowa Utilities Board,214 the Supreme Court considered the permissibility of the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) “unbundling
rules” under the Telecommunications Act, which gave competing telephone service providers access to the incumbent providers’ entire system of “network elements.”215 The Court agreed with the agency
that, given “the breadth of [its] definition,” “network element” was
ambiguous.216 However, the Court concluded that the agency’s unbundling rules were unreasonable because the statute required the
FCC to consider whether the network elements were “necessary” and
whether “failure to provide access to such network elements would
209. Id. (finding that courts upheld the agency’s interpretation as the unambiguously correct
interpretation in 42% of cases).
210. Id. Of those eleven percent of cases, a portion invoked a hard look conception of Step
Two, which this Article ignores. See, e.g., Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133,
150-54 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Other cases, however, applied the redundant interpretive Step Two,
rejecting the agency’s interpretation in a case of “belatedly discovered clear meaning.” Levin,
supra note 4, at 1280–86.
211. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 115 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 6), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2808848.
212. Id.
213. See id. See generally Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706-07 (2015); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2438-49 (2014); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366,
430-31 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring).
214. 525 U.S. at 366.
215. See id. at 370–73.
216. Id. at 386–87.
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impair” competitors from entering the market.217 By providing a
blanket grant to incumbent providers’ network elements, the FCC
failed to apply “some limiting standard” as the statute required.218
According to the Court, “if Congress had wanted to give blanket access to incumbents’ networks on a basis as unrestricted as the scheme
the Commission has come up with, it would not have included [the
limiting provision] in the statute at all.”219 While the Court framed
Iowa Utilities Board as a Step Two decision, it could have been a Step
One decision. The agency’s interpretation was not impermissible for
policy reasons or because it stretched the meaning of the Telecommunications Act. Rather, Congress clearly stated in the act that the FCC
should adopt limiting provisions on the definition of “network element,” which the FCC failed to do. In failing to implement the statute
as Congress intended, FCC strayed outside of its delegated
authority.220
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.221 also illustrates the importance
of statutory clarity. Entergy Corp. concerned an EPA regulation
under the Clean Water Act (CWA), which construed the phrase “best
technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact” to
allow consideration of the technology’s costs. Justice Scalia, who by
his own words believed he applied One-Step Chevron,222 stated the
Chevron standard without including the traditional bifurcation of its
two steps: “[The agency’s] view governs if it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute—not necessarily the only possible interpretation,
217. Id. at 388 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2) (1994)).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 390.
220. The Court’s 2015 decision in Michigan v. EPA follows similar logic as Iowa Utilities
Board. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2705-07 (2015). In Michigan v. EPA, the Court
argued that the agency failed to properly consider whether a regulation was “appropriate and
necessary” under the Clean Air Act because it failed to consider cost. Id. Like Iowa Utilities
Board, the agency failed to properly consider limitations placed on its regulatory authority under
the statute. Michigan v. EPA, however, presents the State Farm conception of Step Two that this
Article rejects. While Justice Scalia’s opinion cites to other statutory provisions requiring consideration of “cost,” the opinion overall relies on a State Farm-esque conception of Step Two. Id.
at 2706–09. The plain language of the statute neither required consideration of cost, nor did the
agency truly stray outside of the “zone of ambiguity.” To the extent that this Article rejects a
hard look Step Two, Michigan v. EPA is irrelevant for consideration beyond this footnote. See
also Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (finding an EPA interpretation unreasonable on grounds that it would permit the EPA to regulate a majority of the
economy).
221. 556 U.S. 208 (2009).
222. Entergy Corp. does not cite Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has
Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009). Rather, Justice Scalia endorsed Entergy Corp. as a
one-step opinion in United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC., 566 U.S. 478, 493 n.1
(2012).
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nor even the interpretation deemed most reasonable by the courts.”223
He presented two possible interpretations of the statute: “best technology available” meaning either the technology “that produces the
most of some good” or the technology “that most efficiently produces
some good.”224
Justice Scalia rejected the former interpretation on three grounds.
First, other provisions of the CWA stated in plain language when the
agency was to adopt regulations aimed at producing the “greatest feasible reduction in water pollution.”225 According to Justice Scalia,
Congress did not use such strong language in this provision as to preclude cost-benefit analysis. Second, respondent argued that other provisions of the CWA originally required the “best available technology
economically achievable,” but the provision at issue did not expressly
authorize the EPA to consider cost.226 Justice Scalia dismissed this
argument, stating that “silence is meant to convey nothing more than
a refusal to tie the agency’s hands as to whether cost-benefit analysis
should be used, and if so to what degree.”227 Finally, he rejected arguments that Supreme Court precedent barred the EPA from considering cost considerations under the Clean Air Act.228 He refused to
apply an earlier case, American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v.
Donovan, in which the Court “relied in part on a statute’s failure to
mention cost-benefit analysis in holding that the relevant agency was
not required to engage in cost-benefit analysis in certain health and
safety standards.”229 Justice Scalia retorted, “Under Chevron, that an
agency is not required to do so does not mean that an agency is not
permitted to do so.”230
Justice Scalia supports his entire argument on the notion that the
Act “does not unambiguously preclude cost-benefit analysis.”231 Justice Scalia’s search for a clear prohibition and his highly deferential
application of Chevron resembles a clear-statement rule.
Contrast Justice Scalia’s opinion with Justice Stevens’ dissent. Justice Stevens pointed to American Textile Manufacturers, in which the
Court held “[w]hen Congress has intended that an agency engage in
223. Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. at 218.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 209.
226. See id. at 219, 221.
227. Id. at 222.
228. Id. at 223 (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 467–68 (2001)).
229. Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. at 223 (citing Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 510–512 (1981)).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
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cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the face of
the statute.”232 Moreover, Justice Stevens argued that Congress does
not “hide elephants in mouseholes”; when Congress wanted the EPA
to consider cost it did so explicitly.233 Finally, according to the dissent,
the “legislative history strongly supports the view that Congress purposefully withheld cost-benefit authority” in similar provisions of the
CWA.234
This exchange between Justices Scalia and Stevens resembles the
opinions of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan in Catholic
Bishop.235 Without an affirmative statement that Congress intended
to prevent the EPA from considering cost, Justice Scalia defers to the
agency’s interpretation. Yet Justice Stevens presented rather persuasive legislative history, contextual clues, and precedent that suggest
otherwise. As applied by Justice Scalia, One-Step Chevron looks like
a clear-statement rule. Admittedly, I hesitate to read too much into
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Entergy Corp. because Justice Scalia championed a robust Step One inquiry.236 Entergy Corp.’s departure from
this robust analysis may otherwise reflect Justice Scalia’s general dislike of environmental law, coupled with courts’ willingness to more
readily defer to agencies in cases involving environmental policy or
science.237 Nevertheless, Entergy Corp. reaffirms that the Court emphasizes the clarity question over the reasonableness question.
V. DUELING CANONS

AND

“REASONABLENESS”

In creating any variation of a single step Chevron, either the clarity
question or the reasonableness question must be disposed of. The
Chevron Canon eliminates the reasonableness question. By abandoning the reasonableness question, the Chevron Canon may allow
for deference to interpretations courts would find unreasonable at
Step Two. As explained in Part III, however, courts’ analyses have
232. Id. at 238–39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc., 452 U.S. at
510).
233. Id. at 238–39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Whitman, 513 U.S. at 467–68).
234. Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235. See supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text.
236. Scalia, supra note 28, at 521 (“In my experience, there is a fairly close correlation between the degree to which a person is (for want of a better word) a ‘strict constructionist’ of
statutes, and the degree to which that person favors Chevron and is willing to give it broad scope.
The reason is obvious. One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is
apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the
triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists.”).
237. See Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory
Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767,
815–17 (2008).
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always focused on whether the statutory text prevents the agency’s
interpretation, not whether the agency arrived at a reasonable interpretation through traditional interpretive means.238 Abandonment of
Step Two, therefore, should not be cause for alarm.
Admittedly, a sliver of interpretations courts would find unreasonable at Step Two—those interpretations that are not clearly prohibited
by the statutory text—may survive the Chevron Canon. Some of
those cases may threaten the Constitution, separation of powers, and
federalism. Any Chevron framework must establish some method of
identifying cases where deference presents too much of a systemic
risk. In the past, courts have occasionally tried to do this through the
“major questions doctrine.”239 Under the major questions doctrine,
courts will not defer to agency’s interpretation in “extraordinary
cases” of “economic and political significance.”240 Scholars, however,
have dismissed the doctrine as “unpredictable”241 and “fruitless.”242
The Supreme Court has never articulated how reviewing courts
should identify “extraordinary cases” with any particularity, preferring an “I know it when I see it” attitude towards the doctrine’s application.243 As such, the major questions doctrine raises more questions
than it answers and remains unworkable as a test for “threatening”
cases.
Rather than relying on amorphous doctrines, courts can use other
substantive canons to check agency power under the Chevron Canon.
Whether substantive canons apply in Chevron cases remains contested. Richard Pierce has opined that “canons are too numerous, in238. See supra notes 118–43 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (“[A] question of deep ‘economic
and political significance’ that is central to the statutory scheme.”); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v.
EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (“We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign an
agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’ ”) (quoting FDA. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
240. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 159–60.
241. Kevin O. Leske, Major Questions About the “Major Questions” Doctrine, 5 MICH. J.
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 479, 500 (2016); see also Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. &
MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 1–2) (arguing that the major-questions doctrine and other “power canons” are without basis in law).
242. See Note, Major Question Objections, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2191, 2192 (2016). But see
Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the Major Questions Exception to Chevron Deference as a
Doctrine of Non-Interference (or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It Wrong), 60 ADMIN L. REV.
593, 598 (2008) (arguing the importance of the major questions doctrine).
243. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also U.S.
Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (per
curiam) (“To be sure, determining whether a rule constitutes a major rule sometimes has a bit of
a ‘know it when you see it quality.’ So there inevitably will be close cases and debates at the
margins about whether a rule qualifies as major.”).
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determinate, and conflicting for use in this context.”244 Substantive
canons present a hurdle in the two-step framework. If a court applies
a substantive canon at Step One, then the canon defeats Chevron because it resolves any ambiguity in the statute in favor of the canon’s
policy concern. Courts applying substantive canons at Step One are
more likely to find clarity because the court will interpret the statute
in the manner that best effectuates the policy concern of the canon. If
a court applies a substantive canon at Step Two, then Chevron defeats
the canon because the court will defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation over the policy presumption of the canon. Applied at
Step Two, substantive canons merely represent an additional policy
consideration the agency may, but is not obligated to, choose to consider when adopting its interpretation.
The Chevron Canon does not entirely solve this problem. Courts
must still consider where the Chevron Canon falls along the continuum of canons. This inquiry, however, becomes much simpler when
understood against the background of the previously discussed literature. Using other institutional clear-statement rules to check agency
interpretive authority resolves two problems. First, it reworks some
form of reasonableness into the Chevron analysis. Second, it resolves
the longstanding dispute of how substantive canons fit into the Chevron framework. This Part concludes that Chevron is a weak clearstatement rule, falling somewhere between tiebreaking canons and
traditional institutional clear-statement rules on the substantive canon
continuum.
A. Tiebreaking Canons
Tiebreaking canons must succumb to the might of Chevron. These
weaker canons form from patterns of past congressional conduct or a
statute’s purpose. Tiebreaking canons reflect judge-made presumptions about how Congress would have interpreted the statute if afforded the opportunity to decide the issue. Courts apply these canons
in traditional statutory interpretation cases because courts must reach
a final interpretation to resolve the matter and canons prevent the
court from intruding too heavily in the policymaking realm. Absent
an applicable agency interpretation, courts apply tiebreaking canons
when they cannot locate any other indicia of congressional intent.
When an agency interprets a statute, however, the court has a
stronger indicia of congressional intent than a judge-made presumption. Delegation demonstrates Congress’s intent for the agency to re244. 1 PIERCE, supra note 11, at 191.
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solve the ambiguity. When Chevron applies, Congress delegated
interpretive authority to the agency because it wanted the agency—
not the courts—to resolve the policy issue.245 Congress had the opportunity to resolve the ambiguity in the agency-administered statute
but left that job to the agency. Courts should respect Congress’s
choice to have an agency resolve the ambiguity rather than applying a
wholesale tiebreaking canon because legislative supremacy requires
courts to respect this policymaking hierarchy.
A more practical reason requires Chevron to overcome tiebreaking
canons. Most tiebreaking canons enforce purposivist norms about the
general policy concerns of a specific regulated area.246 If these regulatory canons defeat Chevron, then they would preclude many agencies
from ever obtaining Chevron deference. For example, courts narrowly interpret exemptions from federal taxation against the taxpayer.247 If this tiebreaking canon supplants Chevron, then the IRS
can never interpret an exemption liberally in favor of taxpayers. Similarly, courts ought to construe ambiguities in the Fair Labor Standards
Act in favor of employees.248 Strict application of this canon prevents
the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) from construing ambiguities
against employees. These canons describe the general missions and
cultures of these agencies—the IRS favors revenue collection and the
DOL favors protecting employees. To the extent that Congress has
left a gap in a statute, these agencies should decide for themselves
how best to effectuate their missions, not judge-made norms derived
from the general purpose of complex statutory regimes.
B. Institutional Clear-Statement Rules
Institutional clear-statement rules promote structural guarantees of
democracy, restrain judges, and warn Congress when its actions
threaten the balance of power.249 Chevron embraces two of these values. First, Chevron protects Congress’s ability to delegate tasks to
agencies. Second, Chevron prevents courts from usurping policymaking authority from the more democratically accountable branches.
Chevron creates a hierarchy of policymaking power with Congress at
top, courts on the bottom, and agencies in the middle.250 Courts re245. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 169, at 765.
246. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 106, at 867–70 (listing and describing how statutory
cannons apply to different subject areas of law).
247. See United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 357 (1988).
248. See Navarro v. Encino Motor Cars, LLC, 780 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S.
Ct. 2117 (2016).
249. See supra notes 118–41 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 153–64 and accompanying text.
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spect this balance of power by deferring to Congress and agencies
when their policies are constitutional.
The Chevron Canon also acknowledges that agencies can overstep
their delegated authority. If a statute is clear, then Congress never
delegated authority to the agency to decide the issue. Yet the Chevron Canon, left to operate with no constraints, leaves a loophole.
Agencies may permissibly interpret a statute but in doing so threaten
the Constitution, federalism, or the separation of powers. Agencies
should not promulgate regulations that threaten these institutional
norms without express delegation. According to principles of legislative supremacy, these fundamental questions ought to be left to the
most democratically accountable branch of government: Congress.
Agencies require some restraint. In part, the APA, resource concerns, and statutory guidelines prevent agencies from grasping at naı̈ve temptations of power.251 But agencies attach a high priority to
their autonomy and protecting their “turf.”252 Agencies may, intentionally or unintentionally, intrude upon state power, other agencies,
or the Constitution to preserve or expand their jurisdiction. For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has continually
expanded its oversight over transmission line siting—a power traditionally left to the states.253 So long as the statute does not prohibit
the agency’s interpretation, the Chevron Canon allows the agency to
test institutional boundaries.
Courts should apply institutional clear-statement rules over Chevron to encourage agency restraint, much as they apply institutional
clear-statement rules in traditional statutory interpretation cases as an
act of judicial restraint. In traditional statutory interpretation cases,
institutional clear-statement rules warn Congress that its actions may
have unintended consequences.254 In the administrative context, however, the agency does not signal Congress when new regulations may
raise similar concerns. Congress does not have the resources to police
every notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure or adjudication, pe251. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
THEY DO IT 119 (1989). For more on congressional oversight, see generally WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41079, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: AN OVERVIEW (2010),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41079.pdf.
252. WILSON, supra note 251, at 180.
253. See Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing the Dormant Commerce Clause Revise
for Interstate Coordination, 100 MINN. L. REV. 129, 140–155 (2015) (describing conflicts between
FERC and state regulatory primacy over siting); see also Matthew R. McGuire, Comment,
(Mis)understanding “Undue Discrimination”: FERC’s Misguided Effort to Extend the Boundaries of the Federal Power Act, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 549, 550–51 (2012).
254. See Barrett, supra note 89, at 175.
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rusing for potentially dangerous regulations. By applying institutional
clear-statement rules over Chevron, the court warns Congress that—
while the statute does not prohibit the agency’s interpretation—the
agency may have overstepped the intended boundaries of delegated
authority.
At times, the Supreme Court has applied institutional clear-statement rules over Chevron. In Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida
Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council,255 the Supreme
Court declined to defer to an agency interpretation that implicated the
First Amendment.256 In Rapanos v. United States,257 Justice Scalia applied the federalism canon to preclude an agency’s interpretation at
Step Two.258 Pursuant to the CWA, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers interpreted “waters of the United States” expansively to include
wetlands.259 The Court had juggled multiple different definitions of
“waters” since 1871,260 leading Justice Scalia to admit that “waters of
the United States” was “inherently ambiguous” at Step One.261 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia concluded that “ ‘waters of the United States’
. . . cannot bear the expansive meaning that the Corps would give
it.”262 At Step Two, Justice Scalia applied the federalism canon in absence of “ ‘a clear and manifest’ statement from Congress,” fearing
that the “Government’s expansive interpretation would ‘result in a
significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power
over land and water use.’ ”263 Rapanos exemplifies how the Chevron
Canon would interact with institutional clear-statement rules. Even
though the statute did not prohibit the agency’s interpretation, Justice
Scalia applied the federalism canon rather than deferring to the
agency’s interpretation under Chevron.
255. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
256. See id. at 575 (“This approach not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional
issues not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound
by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume
that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it.”).
257. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
258. See id. at 737–38.
259. Id. at 719.
260. Id. at 731–32; see also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531
U.S. 159, 168 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985);
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870), superseded by statute, Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act), P.L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, as recognized in
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 740.
261. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 740.
262. Id. at 731–32.
263. Id. at 738 (quoting Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at 174 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
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Some scholars have argued that courts should simply resolve any
constitutional issues presented by an agency interpretation.264 If a
court finds the agency’s interpretation unconstitutional, then the court
has committed no harm since Congress could not have adopted the
agency’s interpretation anyway. However, the court may ultimately
find an agency interpretation constitutional, even if it precariously
teeters on the line of upsetting the balance of government. Perhaps,
however, Congress never wanted the agency to interpret the statute so
close to the constitutional boundary. Institutional clear-statement
rules notify Congress of the potential issue, before the court defers, so
that Congress can respond to the agency’s action by amending the
statute to either support or preclude the agency’s interpretation. On
review, Congress may also reprimand the agency by holding hearings,
curtailing appropriations, or restricting agency authority.265 Until
Congress acts, the agency may adopt a less precarious interpretation
in order to carry out its executive functions.
Institutional clear-statements rules protect structural norms from
agency trespass. They also act as a reasonableness check on agency
power. In effect, the court punts the interpretive question to Congress
to decide whether it truly meant to delegate such authority to the
agency. Thus, institutional clear-statement rules further protect legislative supremacy by ensuring Congress decides fundamental questions
about the functions of our government.
C. The Rule of Lenity
While the Chevron Canon fits well between tiebreaking canons and
clear-statement rules, the rule of lenity presents an additional quandary.266 Depending on her ideology, a judge may apply lenity as a
tiebreaking canon or as a clear-statement rule.267 If lenity embodies a
regulatory norm in the criminal law context, analogous to substantive
canons in the tax or employment law contexts, then Chevron defeats
lenity. If lenity embraces norms of legislative supremacy and fair no264. See Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative
Interpretation of Law: A Brand X Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 139
(2012).
265. See OLESZEK, supra note 251.
266. One that ought to be explored more thoroughly than in the final section of an already
full-length article.
267. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1098–99 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that lenity only applies “after all legitimate tools of interpretation have been exhausted,
[and] ‘a reasonable doubt persists’ regarding whether Congress has made the defendant’s conduct a federal crime” (quoting Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2218 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting))).
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tice, then lenity’s dual quasi-constitutional and regulatory characteristics complicate the Chevron analysis. Like Chevron, lenity succumbs
to other clear-statement rules, such as the avoidance canon.268 Thus,
Chevron and lenity occupy a similar space on the canon continuum.
In a footnote in Babbitt v. Sweet Home,269 the Supreme Court implied that lenity does not foreclose deference.270 Yet circuit courts
continue to examine whether “Chevron still leaves some place for the
rule of lenity.”271 In his concurring opinion in Carter v. Welles-Bowen
Realty, Inc.,272 Sixth Circuit Judge Jeffrey Sutton argued that a court
should not “defer to an agency’s anti-defendant interpretation of a law
backed by criminal penalties.”273 According to Judge Sutton, “Allowing agencies to fill gaps in criminal statutes would impair the rule
of lenity’s purposes.”274 In a memorandum accompanying the denial
of certiorari of Whitman v. United States,275 Justice Scalia acknowledged the conflict between Chevron and the rule of lenity.276 Citing
Justice Sutton’s opinion in Welles-Bowen Realty, Justice Scalia stated,
“Undoubtedly Congress may make it a crime to violate a regulation
. . . but it is quite a different matter for Congress to give agencies—let
alone for us to presume that Congress gave agencies—power to resolve ambiguities in criminal legislation.”277
268. See Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2430 (2006) (discussing
occasions when courts applied the federalism canon over lenity).
269. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704 n.18 (1995).
270. The court noted:
Respondents also argue that the rule of lenity should foreclose any deference to the
Secretary’s interpretation of the ESA because the statute includes criminal penalties. . . . We have applied the rule of lenity in a case raising a narrow question concerning the application of a statute that contains criminal sanctions to a specific factual
dispute—whether pistols with short barrels and attachable should stocks are short-barreled rifles—where no regulation was present. We have never suggested that the rule
of lenity should provide the standard for reviewing facial challenge to administrative
regulations whenever the governing statute authorizes criminal enforcement. Even if
there exist regulations whose interpretations of statutory criminal penalties provide
such inadequate notice of potential liability as to offend the rule of lenity, the “harm”
regulation, which has existed for two decades and gives a fair warning of its consequences, cannot be one of them.
Id. at 704 n.18.
271. Espinal-Andrades v. Holder, 777 F.3d 163, 170 n.4 (4th Cir. 2015) (“In light of Chevron,
some have questioned the rule of lenity’s role in the immigration context.”).
272. 36 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2013).
273. Id. at 730 (Sutton, J., concurring) (“[T]he rule of lenity forbids deference to the executive
branch’s interpretation of a crime-creating law. If an ordinary criminal law contains an uncertainty, every court would agree that it must resolve the uncertainty in the defendant’s favor. No
judge would think of deferring to the Department of Justice.”).
274. Id. at 732.
275. 135 S. Ct. 352 (2014).
276. See id. at 353.
277. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-3\DPL304.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 45

30-AUG-17

THE CLEAR-STATEMENT CHEVRON CANON

12:50

863

The rule of lenity also extends to civil penalties in hybrid criminal/
civil statutes. In Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch,278 Judge Sutton revived
his argument in the deportation context because deportation results in
the civil consequence of removal from the country and possible criminal consequences if the offender attempts to reenter the United States
illegally.279 Similarly, in United States v. Thompson/Center Arms
Co.,280 the Supreme Court applied the rule of lenity in the tax context
because the law included both a civil tax penalty and a criminal penalty.281 Many regulatory statutes impose civil fines or sanctions in addition to criminal penalties. Applying lenity over Chevron precludes
certain agencies from interpreting statutes against the offender. In the
deportation context, the Second Circuit has rebutted that “it cannot
be the case . . . that the doctrine of lenity must be applied whenever
there is an ambiguity in an immigration statute because, if that were
true, it would supplant the application of Chevron in the immigration
context.”282
In the case of hybrid statutes, courts cannot divide the criminal consequences from the civil consequences.283 A statute’s meaning cannot
change from case to case.284 Resolving this conflict requires comparing both Chevron and lenity’s goals.285 I conclude that lenity does not
278. 810 F.3d 1019 (2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016) (mem.).
279. Id. at 1027–28 (Sutton, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
280. 504 U.S. 505 (1992).
281. See id. at 518.
282. Florez v. Holder, 779 F.3d 207, 213 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Ruiz-Almanzar v. Ridge, 485
F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2007)).
283. See Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 730 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J.,
concurring) (“One possibility is to apply the rule of lenity in criminal prosecutions and to defer
to the agency’s position in civil actions. But a statute is not a chameleon. It does not change
from a case to case.” (citing Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–82 (2005))).
284. Clark, 543 U.S. at 380.
285. Many of Sutton’s arguments stem from his conception of a less-deferential Chevron. According to Sutton, Chevron applies only after “deployment of all pertinent interpretive principles.” Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d at 731. In Sutton’s view, Supreme Court precedent
has decided that all substantive canons supersede Chevron. See id. (“All manners of presumptions, substantive canons and clear-statement rules take precedence over conflicting agency
views . . . . [The Court] has confirmed that Chevron does not permit an agency to trump other
rules of interpretation.”). Curiously, the Court failed to deliver this message to the other circuits. See generally Olmos v. Holder, 780 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2015) (applying Chevron over
lenity and the avoidance canon); Florez, 779 F.3d at 207 (arguing lenity does not trump Chevron); Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Sutton also proposes that a number of other non-interpretive facts apply in determining Chevron’s application.
See Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d at 732 (quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222
(2002)). If Chevron requires application of a multi-factor test, then fair notice is unachievable
because no affected individual can predict how a court will weigh these factors.
Sutton’s Chevron looks like Justice Breyer’s “word cloud.” See Hickman, supra note 74, at
541–42 (2014). This weak, multi-factor conception of Chevron appears too much like “th’ol’
‘totality of the circumstances’ test’ ” of yore. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001)
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preclude deference but concede that Chevron requires limiting in the
criminal context.
Both lenity and Chevron rest on legislative supremacy. Lenity supposes that only Congress, not courts, should create criminal law.286
Unless otherwise delegated to an agency, Congress reserves policymaking authority in both the civil and criminal law realms. Lenity is
founded no more on legislative supremacy than any other tool of judicial restraint that prevents courts from encroaching on Congress’s
policymaking authority. In Touby v. United States,287 a case concerning the Attorney General’s controlled substance scheduling authority,
the Supreme Court acknowledged that “the nondelegation doctrine
does not prevent Congress from seeking assistance, within proper limits, from its coordinate Branches.”288 Even Judge Sutton concedes
that if Congress lays down an “intelligible principle,” then Congress
may delegate criminal lawmaking authority to an agency.289
Yet Judge Sutton argues that Congress must “legislate deliberately
and explicitly” when it wants an agency to promulgate criminal regulations.290 According to Judge Sutton, if Chevron supersedes lenity,
then “courts could presume a congressional delegation of authority to
create crimes whenever a criminal statute contains a gap.”291 But this
is not an argument against the application of Chevron in the criminal
context, rather it is an attack on the entire doctrine. The purpose of
Chevron is to presume that Congress left the agency the power to fill
these gaps—whether criminal or civil in nature. Congress expects and
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court—aside from Breyer—rejected this conception when
it held that Chevron and Skidmore operate as different standards. If courts should apply every
conceivable interpretive tool, as well as a host of extraneous factors, before considering Chevron, then what distinction exists between Skidmore and Chevron? The Chevron Canon reinforces Chevron as the stronger of the two deference standards. Sutton’s argument that all
substantive canons displace deference ignores the advantage of dividing canons by their imbued
policy goals (as I have done) to protect both Congress’s delegation powers and other quasiconstitutional norms. This, however, is not an argument for applying Chevron over lenity. One
can adopt the Chevron Canon and still find lenity supreme. Rather, this point simply suggests
that nothing about the Chevron Canon’s structure prohibits its application over lenity.
286. Historically, courts could create common law crimes. These common law crimes remain
valid in some states. At the federal level, however, common law crimes have been abolished.
287. 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991).
288. Id. at 165.
289. See Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d at 733–34 (Sutton, J., concurring) (“Congress’s
authority to define crimes is not exclusive. Although the Constitution as a general matter vests
power to define crimes in Congress alone, the modern nondelegation doctrine, it is true, occasionally allows Congress to transfer some responsibility for defining crimes to the executive
branch.”).
290. Id. at 733 (Sutton, J., concurring).
291. Id. (Sutton, J., concurring).
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wants the agency to fill these gaps.292 If Congress does not want the
agency to fill gaps in criminal statutes, it will draft clear and unambiguous penal statutes or prohibit the agency from exercising its rulemaking authority with respect to the particular provisions at issue.
Congress can delegate its authority to create criminal laws in the same
way it delegates its authority to create tax, immigration, or employment laws.
Applying lenity over Chevron curbs Congress’s power to delegate
authority to agencies. In allowing an agency to interpret criminal and
hybrid statutes, Congress has decided that an agency is better
equipped to create the necessary laws. In effect, applying lenity over
Chevron prevents Congress from delegating this authority. Due to the
prevalence of hybrid statutes, Congress would lose the authority to
delegate interpretive questions to many agencies. In the modern regulatory era, Congress cannot effectively respond to every issue as it
arises. Hence, Congress delegates authority to agencies, which have
more resources and expertise to contemporaneously adapt to issues.
Legislative supremacy cannot explain why lenity would trump
Chevron. If lenity precludes deference, then it must be because Chevron does not provide fair notice of criminalized conduct. If Chevron
does not provide adequate notice it is because the agency did not promulgate its interpretation in publicized materials. Judge Sutton fears
that “[a]ll kinds of administrative documents, ranging from manuals to
opinion letters, sometimes receive Chevron deference.”293 The Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Mead Corp., however, requires that an agency adopt its interpretation pursuant to the
delegation of Congressional authority to act with “force of law” to be
eligible for Chevron deference.294 Judge Sutton’s cited materials generally lack the “force of law” and do not warrant Chevron deference.295 Though an over-generalization and by no means allinclusive,296 Chevron typically applies to interpretations adopted in
292. Bressman & Gluck, supra note 169, at 729.
293. See Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d at 732 (Sutton, J., concurring) (citing Barnhart v.
Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 211–22 (2002)).
294. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
295. See Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“Interpretations such as those in
opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style
deference.”).
296. Mead itself specifies that “the want [of notice-and-comment rulemaking] does not decide
the case, for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 230–31. Justice
Breyer insists that—beyond procedure—the Court should consider “the interstitial nature of the
legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administra-
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notice-and-comment rulemaking or agency adjudications. Notice-andcomment rulemaking provides even more fair notice than congressionally created laws.297 Before Congress passes legislation authorizing
an agency to regulate criminal conduct, the concerned individual may
voice her opinion to congressional representatives. If she remains unsatisfied with Congress’s delegation, then she may participate in the
agency’s rulemaking proceedings.298 Moreover, the Federal Register
publishes promulgated rules so individuals would have codified notice
of criminalized conduct.299
Judge Sutton worries that agencies may promulgate vague criminal
regulations, only to interpret them more harshly in interpretive
rules.300 An agency’s interpretation of its own regulations receives
highly deferential treatment from courts under Auer deference but
avoids the public rulemaking procedures.301 This argument fails to attack Chevron. Rather, it merely suggests that lenity should overcome
Auer because Auer cannot guarantee the same notice guarantees as
Chevron.302 While Chevron and Auer are certainly related, courts apply the two standards in separate circumstances. Courts can (and
should) restrict Auer without altering Chevron.
While notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures provide fair notice and enhance democratic participation, agency adjudications present other problems. Judge Sutton argues that contemporaneous
interpretation of criminal statutes in agency adjudications may implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause.303 Indeed, courts apply lenity to avoid
notice-less expansions of criminal law. In a deportation proceeding,
the Board of Immigration Appeals may expansively interpret a civil
tion of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the
Agency has given the question over a long period of time.” Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222. Thus,
Chevron may apply to more informal agency materials. For the sake of this Article, this generalization suffices.
297. See VANESSA K. BURROWS & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41546, A
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 1–3 (2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R41546.pdf (describing the requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking); see also 5
U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).
298. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (requiring agencies to give interested parties an opportunity to
comment of the proposed rules).
299. See id. § 553(d) (requiring publication thirty days before the rule’s effective date).
300. Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 732–33 (6th Cir. 2013).
301. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
302. It may also support the notion that the Supreme Court should just abandon Auer deference. See Nicholas R. Bednar, Defying Auer Deference: Skidmore as a Solution to Conservative
Concerns in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, MINN. L. REV.: DE NOVO (June 24, 2015),
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/2015/06/defying-auer-deference-skidmore-solution-conserva
tive-concerns-perez-v-mortgage-bankers-association/.
303. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d at 733.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-3\DPL304.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 49

30-AUG-17

THE CLEAR-STATEMENT CHEVRON CANON

12:50

867

deportation provision contained in a hybrid statute and still receive
Chevron deference.304 Prior to that immigration proceeding, the defendant may have had no knowledge or expectation that her actions
would result in deportation and additional criminal penalties. Contemporaneous interpretation of criminal or hybrid statutes, without
the benefit of lenity, denies defendants fair notice of criminalized conduct, regardless of whether the interpretation comes from courts or
agencies.
At the same time, courts should not categorically deny Congress’s
authority to delegate interpretive power over criminal or hybrid statutes to agencies. As one possible solution, courts could ensure fair
notice by modifying Mead. Instead of applying Chevron whenever
agencies act with the force of law in the criminal context, courts could
require agencies interpreting criminal or hybrid statutes to do so in
notice-and-comment regulations. The interpretation arrived at in adjudication would receive Skidmore deference, but lenity should prevent the agency from criminalizing conduct the defendant reasonably
assumed was permissible under the statute. The agency remains free
to interpret criminal or hybrid statutes, but it must do so in a manner
that provides regulated parties with warning and the opportunity for
democratic participation.305 This approach encourages agencies to use
notice-and-comment rulemaking to codify interpretations rather than
rely on adjudication. It further preserves fair notice, while also ensuring that Congress gets the help it needs in implementing penal statutes. As things stand, Chevron should trump lenity.
VI. OBJECTIONS

TO A

CHEVRON CANON

The Chevron Canon works like any other clear-statement rule and
offers more simplicity than either One-Step Chevron or Traditional
Chevron. Those interested in One-Step Chevron have already decided to abandon Chevron’s two steps and are seeking alternative formulations. But scholars and jurists are right to be skeptical of any
alternative formulation that purportedly makes a thirty-year-old stan304. See, e.g., Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1025 (6th Cir. 2016).
305. I recognize that this modification to Chevron conflicts with longstanding Supreme Court
precedent that an agency may choose to make rules through rulemaking procedures or adjudication. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947). Perhaps an exception ought to be
made when a rule raises criminal concerns or the Chenery II doctrine should be reconsidered in
general. See generally Russell L. Weaver, Chenery II: A Forty Year Retrospective, 40 ADMIN. L.
REV. 161 (1988) (discussing the controversy surrounding Chenery II). I am not the first to suggest that perhaps deference is owed to agency interpretations adopted in rulemaking but not
adjudication. See J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 147–49 (1938). But see Scalia,
supra note 28, at 519.
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dard “easier” to apply. This final Part thus discusses potential critiques of the Chevron Canon.
A. A Tiebreaking Chevron?
A Chevron Canon works best as a clear-statement rule because it
mirrors the traditional policy values and weight of a clear-statement
rule. Yet one might argue that the Chevron Canon works best as a
weaker tiebreaking canon. As a tiebreaker, the court searches not for
clear text prohibiting the agency’s interpretation, but rather any indicia of congressional intent that contradicts the agency’s interpretation.
Under this conception, Chevron advances an administrative law norm
that, when presented with two equally ambiguous interpretations, the
court should defer to the agency’s interpretation. A tiebreaking Chevron ignores the fact that Chevron is a highly deferential standard. Justice Scalia believed that
Chevron becomes virtually meaningless . . . if ambiguity exists only
when the arguments for and against the various possible interpretations are in absolute equipoise . . . . If Chevron is to have any meaning, then, congressional intent must be regarded as ‘ambiguous’ not
just when no interpretation is even marginally better than any other,
but rather when two or more reasonable, though not necessarily
equally valid, interpretations exist.306

a tiebreaking Chevron canon may appeal to those judges worried
about ceding judicial power to the executive branch. Judges need not
worry about the Chevron Canon depriving them of their interpretive
ideology because they will still need to identify the limits of “clarity.”
But I acknowledge that a tiebreaking Chevron canon may work best if
courts hope to weaken Chevron. This Article, however, does not argue for a weaker Chevron, just a simpler Chevron that preserves its
historical values and weight.
B. Classic Objections to a Chevron Canon
Scholars initially advanced three possible legal foundations for
Chevron: the Constitution, federal common law, and congressional intent.307 As my analysis above suggests, Chevron contains elements of
all three foundations. In their article, Chevron’s Domain, Thomas
Merrill and Kristin Hickman rejected the constitutional and common
law framings,308 and the Supreme Court seemed to validate their argu306. Scalia, supra note 28.
307. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 166 at 863.
308. See id. at 867–70 (“Chevron is more difficult to situate within the traditions associated
with judge-made norms of self-governance.”).
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ments by favorable citation in United States v. Mead Corp.309 Fifteen
years have passed since Chevron’s Domain but scholars and courts
continue to toy with Chevron’s proper place in the interpretive regime.310 If the rising prominence of Stephenson and Vermeule’s OneStep Chevron tells us anything, it is that scholars and courts remain
unhappy with where Chevron has ended up.311 I tussle with Merill
and Hickman’s critiques of conceptualizing Chevron as a canon and
conclude that these critiques are now outdated.
Merrill and Hickman recognized that if Chevron is a common law
rule created by the Supreme Court, it is best analogized to a substantive canon.312 “If Chevron is just another canon of interpretation,
then application of the Chevron doctrine is no more inconsistent with
the exercise of independent judicial judgment than it is for courts to
refer to rules of grammar or canons like the doctrine of lenity.”313
But, “if Chevron is just a canon, this makes it difficult to explain why
Chevron deference is described as being mandatory.”314 Indeed,
Chevron enjoys universal application. In its application, however,
Chevron is only “mandatory” “if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue” and the agency adopts “a permissible construction of the statute.”315 The Chevron Canon can never
supplant clear statutory text. How mandatory the Chevron Canon
ends up being depends upon on how thoroughly the court searches for
statutory clarity.316 Even Merrill and Hickman admit that “[s]ome judicially developed norms approach the level of mandatory duties.”317
Clear-statement rules are just as mandatory as Chevron when courts
apply them. Courts have often framed the avoidance canon as mandating the court’s selected interpretation.318 To the extent that Chev309. 533 U.S. 218, 230 n.11 (2001).
310. See Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867
(2015).
311. See Jack M. Beerman, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779 (2010); Herz, supra note
310, at 1867; see also Vikram David Amar, Chevron Deference and the Proposed “Separation of
Powers Restoration Act of 2016”: A Sign of the Times, VERDICT JUSTIA (July 26, 2016), https://
verdict.justia.com/2016/07/26/chevron-deference-proposed-separation-powers-restoration-act2016-sign-times.
312. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 166, at 868.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
316. See Scalia, supra note 28, at 520 (“[T]he ambiguity [ ] prevents it from being an absolutely clear guide to future judicial decisions.”).
317. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 166, at 869.
318. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise
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ron may be framed as a clear-statement rule, Chevron’s mandatory
application supports, rather than prevents, the construction of Chevron as a clear-statement rule.
Second, “the Court rarely speaks of Chevron if it were a judgemade norm.”319 True. But failure to label Chevron as a substantive
canon does not exclude courts from applying Chevron in a substantive
canon-like manner. Entergy Corp. demonstrates that judges sometimes adopt substantive canon-like Chevron analyses, even if they do
not label them as such. If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and
quacks like a duck, then it is probably a duck.320 Overcoming this hurdle simply requires a shift in labelling.
Third, “the Court has already developed one common-law deference doctrine: the Skidmore doctrine.”321 The suggestion that only
one common-law deference regime can exist ignores the foundational
premise of Chevron’s Domain—Skidmore and Chevron coexist. Earlier in their article, the authors contend that “[t]his large menu of options allows Chevron to be given a relatively narrow domain, one that
hopefully captures those circumstances where deference is most appropriate. Skidmore then steps into the breach and allows courts to
give appropriate weight to agency interpretations outside the core
area where Chevron holds sway.”322 Constructing Chevron as a substantive canon does not abrogate the Mead doctrine. Chevron may
operate as a strong substantive canon that applies in cases where the
agency has the authority to act with and pursuant to the force of law.
Skidmore’s factors apply to other agency interpretations. By way of
comparison, one can imagine a criminal case where lenity may apply
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. This cardinal principle . . .
has for so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate.” (citations omitted)); Hooper
v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) (“The elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”); Parson v. Bedford,
28 U.S. 433, 448–49 (1830) (“No court ought, unless the terms of an act render it unavoidable, to
give a construction to it which should involve a violation, however unintentional, of the
constitution.”).
319. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 166, at 869.
320. Compare RICHARD H. IMMERMAN, THE CIA IN GUATEMALA: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF
INTERVENTION 102 (1982) (“[S]uppose you see a bird walking around in a farm yard. The bird
has no label that says ‘duck.’ But the bird certainly looks like a duck. Also, he goes to the pond
and you notice he swims like a duck. Then he opens his beak and quacks like a duck. Well, by
this time you have probably reached the conclusion that the bird is a duck, whether he’s wearing
a label or not.”), with DOUGLAS ADAMS, DIRK GENTLY’S HOLISTIC DETECTIVE AGENCY 270
(1987) (“If it looks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, we have at least to consider the possibility that we have a small aquatic bird of the family Anatidae on our hands.”).
321. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 166, at 870.
322. Id.
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as a tiebreaker, but the avoidance canon undeniably applies to avoid
Fifth Amendment concerns.323 It is not, as Merrill and Hickman
claim, “anomalous” to have two common-law deference doctrines.
Finally, Merrill and Hickman argue that the Chevron Canon “raises
a host of problems” fitting the doctrine into the “mélange of canons.”
Merrill and Hickman list several possible rationales for this “mélange
of canons,” including “congressional intent.” Courts historically
crafted substantive canons based on presumptions of congressional intent.324 Chevron is also based on congressional intent. In fact, Merrill
and Hickman pioneered the congressional-intent model of Chevron.
Furthermore, “[m]ost strong canons have some constitutional underpinning (like the doctrine of lenity or the federalism canons), or reflect institutional imperatives (like the judge-made norm requiring
lower courts to follow Supreme Court precedents until overruled).”325
Courts, however, have begun using constitutional rhetoric to rationalize Chevron’s existence.326 Chevron protects legislative supremacy
and the policymaking hierarchy of the U.S. government. Therefore,
Chevron incorporates sufficient institutional values to create a clearstatement rule. In finding that Chevron does not fit with other substantive canons, the authors conflate Chevron’s rationale with the vehicle of its application. Chevron’s policy rationale is congressional
intent; “substantive canon” is not a policy rationale. A Chevron Canon is the means by which courts effectuate congressional intent in the
agency interpretation context.
At time of Chevron’s Domain, Merrill and Hickman synthesized
and created the theoretical foundations for the Mead Doctrine.327
Their arguments, however, were merely descriptive: describing Chevron as then applied and understood by the courts. Their arguments do
not foreclose the possibility that Chevron may now be reformed. As
Chevron retreats into a period of skepticism, a Chevron Canon—
founded in the same legislative supremacy arguments advanced by
Hickman and Merrill—offers the chance to breathe new life into this
deference doctrine.

323. Cf. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 404–12 (2010) (applying the avoidance canon
in a criminal case to avoid vagueness and later buttressing this holding with lenity).
324. Barrett, supra note 89, at 158.
325. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 166, at 871.
326. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
327. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 n.11 (2001) (citing Merrill & Hickman, supra note 166, at 872).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Courts are searching for alternative formulations of Chevron.
While One-Step Chevron has attracted some judges through its promise of eliminating redundancy, it can be more practically implemented
by a clear-statement rule. Like other clear-statement rules, Chevron
embodies institutional norms that ensure the balance of the U.S. system of government, like the federalism canon or the avoidance canon.
The Chevron Canon represents a formula for determining and protecting the hierarchy of policymaking authority of the federal
government.
Beyond its normative justifications, the Chevron Canon works like
any other clear-statement rule and offers more simplicity than either
One-Step Chevron or Traditional Chevron. The court neither
searches for a zone of ambiguity nor tangles with the redundancy of
Chevron’s two steps. Rather, Chevron is reformed as an interpretive
tool judges already utilize, resulting in a more traditional statutory interpretation analysis. Unlike One-Step Chevron, the Chevron Canon
preserves Brand X because a clear-statement rule focuses on whether
the statute clearly prohibits the agency’s interpretation. If the court
applies the Chevron Canon and finds that the statute provides no clear
guidance, then the agency may change its interpretation at will. The
Chevron Canon also resolves longstanding concerns about Chevron’s
role in the dueling canons problem. Competing institutional clearstatement norms can protect fundamental principles of U.S. government, while providing agencies the policy space necessary to act as
Congress’s faithful agents. Compared to One-Step Chevron, the
Chevron Canon offers a simplified standard that nests well with other
interpretive tools.
The Chevron Canon is just one of many alternative formulations
that may take root in the years to come. Offered against competing
alternatives, however, it warrants consideration by the courts.

